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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
is the Response Brief of Respondents-Cross-Appellants Lemhi County (the 
"County"), et al. The County agrees with the first two portions of Appellant Brian Sopatyk's 
statement of the case (nature of the case and course of the proceedings) in his Opening Brief 
County issue with some allegations, and conclusions set out in Mr. 
statement instead following brief statement of facts. 
Idaho law, public roads be created in any foHowing ways:! (1) by 
blanket legislative action (for roads public use prior to 1881), (2) by formal action of the 
(public use and malmten,mc:e, or just public use 
of acceptance 
to 2 The last way 
positive is similar to the second (formal dedication), but is a more lax standard. 
County found that Anderson Creek Road ("ACR") qualifies as a public road under 
each of the road creation tests. It validated approximately 8,500 feet (about a mile and a 
half) of ACR from Gibbonsville to the Salmon National Forest. The District Court upheld the 
decision on the basis of blanket legislative action and common law dedication, and found it 
to reach the remaining theories. 33 (Memorandum Decision at 10). 
This case is the natural sequel to Farrell v. Bd. o/County Comm'rs o/Lemhi County, 138 
Idaho 378,64 P.3d 304 (2002), and Galli v. Idaho County, 146 Idaho 155, 191 P.3d 233 (2008). 
I In addition to these, public roads may be created by express conveyance or express dedication through the 
platting process. This did not occur here. 
2 The full citation is: An Act Granting the Right-of-way to Ditch and Canal Owners Over the Public Lands 
and for Other Purposes, also known as the Mining Act of 1866, also known as Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 8, 14 
Stat. 251,253 (1866) (previously codified at Revised Statutes § 2477 (1873) ("R.S. 2477"), re-codified at 43 V.S.c. 
§ 932 (1938», repealed by Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976 ("FLPMA") § 706(a), Pub. lines No. 94-
579,90 Stat. 2743,2793 (1976). 
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Farrell defined the legal mechanisms for road creation, notably articulating the standard 
RS. 2477 roads and recognizing common law dedication in the context of public lands. 
Galli addressed the important question of how much evidence is required to establish a public 
road. Galli recognized that validations of ancient Idaho roads, there is rarely much "direct 
lat~nCe of public use, in the proper case, public use may be inferred from 
there is evidence and 
a transportation network serving a thriving, turn-of-
as far as ....,"J.H •• 'VU, England. 
used hunters, 
runs Mr. Sopatyk, 
blocked all public access. 
record contains substantial evidence from which it may reasonably be inferred that 
ACRhas been public use at least since the creation of the Gibbonsville townsite 
in 1878. It originally served as Main Street (running north-south) in this early mining 
boomtown. it continued north along Anderson Creek, serving as the main "wagon 
a to a network of mines. 
Another street, then called Percy Street, ran perpendicular (east-west) through 
Gibbonsville. 
When hydraulic placer mining undermined parts of the original townsite in about 1897, 
the town moved to the east, and former Percy Street became the new Main Street. Despite the 
relocation of the town following the washout, ACR continued to serve as the main "wagon road" 
serving the mining community (running north-south along Anderson Creek). 
RESPONSE BRIEF 
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ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON ApPEAL 
The first four items in Mr. Sopatyk's statement of issues on appeal are a paraphrasing of 
the standards of review under Idaho Code § 40-208(7). Although correctly stated, their recitation 
does little to assist the Court in understanding the issues on appeaL Accordingly, we offer the 
following summary issues. 
Who bears the burden of proof? 
established by UUMlJA"" legislative declaration 1881 as shown by (l) the 
1878 townsite petition and (2) history of extensive mining before 1881? 
established by LVLJ,LUH the 1892 
realignment? 
1893 or by 
use maintenance after 1 
Was established by common dedication as shown by the 1897 patent and 
accompanying plat and survey notes? 
Was ACR established pursuant to R.S. 2477 and, specifically, does the 1878 petition 
and the 1 realignment show that road meets the "some positive act" test? 
abandonment? 
8. alleged encroachment onto federal land make any difference? 
to validate feet wide? 
10. County's findings as to the local public interest sufficiently articulated? 
11. Mr. allegations as to a prior County Commissioner have any 
bearing on this matter? 
12. Should attorney fees be awarded to either party? 
RESPONSE BRIEF 
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ATTORNEY FEES ON ApPEAL 
The County seeks reversal ofthe denial of attorney fees by the District Court It also 
seeks attorney fees on this appeaL The basis of the County's claims and its objection to Mr. 
Sopatyk's claim for attorney is set out in section IV at page 42. 
ARGUMENT 
I. WAS CREATED AS A PUBLIC ROAD. 
was used by the public prior to 1881, and therefore became a 
public road by operation of legislative declaration in 1881. 
blanket declarations of public roads by Territorial Legislature. 3 
1881 statute matters and there is ample 
1 1 statute or highways laid out or now traveled, or which 
have been commonly used by the pUblic ... are hereby declared county roads .... " Gen. Laws 
of the Territory of Idaho, at 277, § 1 (1881). There was no requirement of public maintenance 
and no minimum number of that the road be in public use. Thus, if the facts show that 
was VVl.UU.1VHLY used public on or "'",1",... .... 1881, road became a public road 
by operation oflaw. The County so found 5 (January 24,2005, Findings a/Fact and 
Conclusions a/Law ("Findings"» at 7, Finding Nos. 46 and 47) as did the District Court. 
The evidence shows that ACR was in existence in 1878 when miners in the Dahlonega 
Mining District met to establish the Gibbonsville Townsite. The evidence is found in a petition, 
signed by the president of a committee of miners, which was submitted to and recorded by the 
Dahlonega Mining District, Lemhi County, Idaho Territory on August 12, 1878. Ex. 3, C-5 
(Minutes, Townsite ofGibbonsviHe; Ex. 3, C-4 (Plat of Gibbonsville». The petition recites the 
3 Laws of the Territory ofIdaho, at p. 578, § I (1864) (repealed); Compiled and Revised Laws of the 
Territory ofIdaho, at p. 677, § 1 (1875) (repealed); Gen. Laws of the Territory ofIdaho, at p. 277, § 1 (1881) 
(repealed). An 1885 statute recognized the prior blanket declarations, but did not contain another such blanket 
declaration. Gen. Laws of the Territory ofIdaho, at p. 162, § 1 (1885) (repealed). 
RESPONSE BRIEF 
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events of a miners' meeting on August 1878, in which a new townsite was approved on 
Anderson Creek. The third paragraph noted expressly: "The road up Anderson Creek to be left 
open .... " The eighth paragraph recited: "That the street up Anderson Creek be called Main 
Street and the other Percy Street." The minutes were accompanied by a "Plat of Gibbonsville" 
Street ft and (Plat of 
was to IS uncontroverted, and direct 
in existence The only thing remaining is inference 
was activity to justify creation a 
aOICmneIlt substantial mining activity 
Imm~~Qlate area 
t'rCIS1)lectlmg continued in the Gibbonsville area, and by 
continuing strikes of gold set off a 
Idaho. '" 
gold brought some experienced 
nrr."r,,"£"'!',nr" into the Gibbonsville area, one of whom was 
Anderson of Leesburg, Idaho. On August 10, 1877, 
claims, and one which later turned 
out to be richest, the north slope of Dahlonega Creek on 
the east outskirts of the Gibbonsville Townsite. These claims later 
,",LU.LUt.,,,, of the American Development and 
Reduction Mining Company (A & M). On September 5, 1877, 
Frank and Tingeley located claims that later became the Twin 
Brothers Mine, just to the southeast of Gibbonsville along the 
south slope of Dahlonega Creek .. " The third most important 
mine in the Gibbonsville area was the Clara Morris located along 
the east slope of Anderson Creek, about 1 Yz miles north of the 
Gibbonsville Townsite. This mine produced an estimated 
4 Mr. Sopatyk states in his Opening Brief at 9-10, "There is no evidence that any actual road was built 
before or in 1878 or that it was used." Rather than address the evidence upon which the County and the District 
Court expressly relied, Mr. Sopatyk continues to ignore the evidence and misstate the record on this appeaL Failing 
to respond to evidence and arguments that have been laid out repeatedly below and stating instead that the County 
provided only "conclusory statements" that "do not qualify as evidence," Opening Brief at 10, falls short of the duty 
of candor that Mr. Sopatyk and his counsel owe the Court. 
RESPONSE BRIEF 
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$250,000 .... 
In 1878, the miners in the Gibbonsville area formed the 
Dahlonega Mining District ... , !y!s!§.LQ!J~1lli~~~~~!lli! 
the lode veins had been found by the end of 1877, before the 
~~~~~~~~~ ... Also during 1878, Ira Tingeley 
and Frank Carey built the first quartz stamp mill for the Twin 
Brothers Mine, the first hard-rock mining was underway at 
Gibbonsville. 
In 1881, Messrs. Johnson, Walker & Co. of London, 
",aM"'''''',", seven claims that were originally found by 
Anderson, along with a 10-stamp mill for $250,000. 
Years at 78-80) (emphasis supplied). 
Gibbonsville had its beginnings in 1877 when placers were 
r>rnlP1!"l"" on Their presence led to the location 
of gold-bearing veins in September of that same year. During the 
fall, one arrasta was build two were added the next year. 
this means to a ton was saved. Early in 1881, most of the 
were to an English company which later 
"IUIUat.LVH and sold the property to Adelbert Ames of 
" .... "' .. .,i""'rI them for a number of years. 
Not Die), also found at Ex. 4, 
If that is not ,",u"'u.-.u. contains a map (part of a publication by the U.S. 
Geological Survey P-8 and Ex. 3, C-20-C (Geology and Ore Deposits at 4 
au",·,,,, ... "Wagon running north-south along Anderson Creek 
through the V'~'V~L~ now by Mr. Sopatyk. The road provides access to many of the very 
claims mentioned above as being in existence on or about 1877, including the Clara Morris 
lJa;:,;:,al';";; as "third most important mine in the Gibbonsville area"). 
author does not list the exact date the Clara Morris went in, but it is discussed in the context 
others that went in 1877. Moreover, the author states in the quotation above: "Most of 
the placer deposits, and the lode veins had been found by the end of 1877 .... " Any doubt that 
this mine, directly accessed by ACR, was in place by 1881 or earlier is resolved by a discussion 
RESPONSE BRIEF 
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in another sonrce describing the Clara Morris as "one of the older ones in the district. Ex. 
20-C (Geology and Ore Deposits at 133). 
It is a reasonable inference that mining at the Clara Morris and elsewhere in the 
immediate vicinity of ACR must have relied on the main "wagon road" accessing these mines. 
to Sopatyk's implication, did not just access his property. Unlike the 
1881 is not ona scattered "cabins 
"'",,''''''',,",UL magnitnde to attracted the attention 
tC>"~A',£' as far away as New and London. (See quotations above.) As the District 
could that the owners 
a to access " 
unavoidable inference, coupled the express statement in the miners' 1 
petition that the was in existence at the time road up Anderson Creek to be left 
is more than sufficient to uphold conclusion the road was established 
by legislative declaration in 1881. The County is entitled to deference in this factnal 
detennination. It cannot be said that the County's conclusion was rendered in the absence 
substantial Galli, Idaho at 1 1 P .3d at 236. 
5 Mr. Sopatyk misstates the holding in Galli. He said, incorrectly, "As held in Galli, there must be an 
'express statement' affirmatively proving the existence and use of ACR for five (years) prior to February 20, 1897." 
Opening Brief at 19. In fact, this Court held that the evidence need not be express or direct. Rather, public use may 
be established by inference based on circumstantial evidence so long as the evidence is strong enough to support the 
inference. "Although direct evidence is not required, there must be sufficient circumstantial evidence in support of 
any inferences." Galli, 146 at 161, 191 P.3d at 239. In Galli, the Court found that evidence of some "cabins and 
fences" in 1902 was insufficient to support an inference that the road in question had been there three years earlier. 
The contrast with the case at bar is overwhelming. The Galli case, by the way, arose in a peculiar posture. For no 
apparent reason, the proponent of the road presented his case solely on the basis ofR.S. 2477. Lemhi County, in 
contrast, considered all five road creation theories. 
RESPONSE BRIEF 
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noted in footnote 4 at page 10, Mr. Sopatyk fails to grapple with this evidence. 
Instead, responds in two ways. 
Mr. Sopatyk contends, "It was also admitted by the county historian that owners of 
gold mines did not allow unfettered access into their gold fields by way of public roads." 
Opening Brief at ,nr,,,nIV and his counsel have not been forthcoming with the Court. The 
on 'nnm~"v are no more unsuccessful effort to 
6 it is hardly plausible that a private road 
built to access property with the intent of excluding others would be labeled 
"wagon It was not unreasonable the County to conclude 
lJec::allse it was pnmary means 
access to by many miners and other 'U'-'UHI..." 
of the mtere:ncie, and there are no facts to the contrary. 
a "lack ofland division" somehow undermines the 
at 9. the land was subdivided. For 
example, ,",U"HUe", carved out of the public domain and now owned by Mr. 
Sopatyk, is a fonn And, course, the lots along in Gibbonsville were 
6 The full colloquy between Sopatyk's counsel and the County's historian is as follows: 
MR. SAETRUM: Is it normal, from your study of history, to allow the public 
unfettered access to a successful mining operation? 
MS. BENEDICT: No. 
MR. SAETRUJ\1: Would that suggest that the owner would keep the road 
private so that the public couldn't wander through there? 
MS. BENEDICT: Well, according to the documents that I have, they did not 
keep it private." 
Ex. 1, p. 87, II. 14-22 (Tr. Public Hearing Sept. 27,2004 ("2004 Hearing"». Having heard from the witness that the 
evidence shows the road was not kept private, Mr. Sopatyk's counsel stopped the line of questioning and tumed to 
other matters. 
7 ACR is also described as a "wagon road" in Ex. 4, P-9 (Recorder Herald newspaper report stating, "The 
citizens of Gibbonsville have just. completed the survey for a wagon road over the divide into Montana. The route 
selected is via Anderson Creek and Three Mile."); Ex. 3, C-l 0 (plat of mill site along Anderson Creek shows ACR 
labeled "wagon road"); Ex. 3, C-I (ACR is also referenced in the field notes to Mineral Survey No. 1170 at page 68: 
"Edge of wagon road, course southwest and northwest."). 
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subdivided. Mr. Sopatyk's point is not only wrong, it is irrelevant. None of the road creation 
methods, other than common law dedication, requires subdivision or conveyance ofland. 
B. ACR was created by formal action of the County. 
(1) Approval of the 1892 relocation of ACR as a public road 
satisfies the "formal action" test. 
the years various Idaho statutes have authorized local governments to create public 
roads by official action as they determine appropriate. (See Appendix A.) The operative statute 
in this case is the one adopted in 1887. It provided: 
years, are highways. 
Rev. Stat. Idaho § 1 887) (emphasis shows the action" portion of statute). 
In other words, to satisfy this statutory requirement, all that is required is (1) that there be an 
order the county commission recognizing that the road is part of the public road system and 
that the order be 7"""(",....rr1,,,{1 
on 1, 1 TUT,POHIP petitioners filed a petition 
with the .LJVLHHA County Commissioners.8 C-8 (1892 Relocation 
Petition). petitioners, headed by one Chas. J. Barclay, described themselves as "residents of 
Road District No.6. petitioners employed a printed designed for validation of new 
public roads. However, petitioners modified the form to request that the location of two 
existing roads be adjusted slightly to avoid cutting across a lot. 
8 The 1878 miners' petition does not satisfY this statutory requirement for formal action, because the action 
was not taken by the County Commissioners. See Ex. 5 (Findings at 7-8, Finding No. 50). 
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The petition includes a hand-drawn diagram showing Main Street and Percy Street-the 
same streets shown in the 1878 plat.9 The longer street (Main Street) is shown on the horizontal 
axis, while the shorter Percy Street is on a vertical axis. The drawing is not marked to show 
which direction is north. The County reasonably concluded that it was drawn in this fashion in 
order to fit Main Street into the longer horizontal space available on the page for the drawing. 
5, (Findings at 5, Finding No. 28). 
This 1 petition was properly recorded the Lemhi County Road Book, Volume 
(Hope Benedict's September 27,2004 Summary of Evidence (first document of Ex. 3) 
Summary") at 5). On the same day, the County Commissioners approved the 
(Commissioners Mllllutes approval, likewise, were 
(Benedict Summary at 
This action was a formal recognition of the public status of the road taken by the County 
Commissioners. It was properly recorded. Accordingly, ACR was recognized as a public road 
in accordance with section 851. Sopatyk denies none of this, but offers four quibbles. 
(2) Location versus relocation: A distinction without a difference. 
Mr. Sopatyk complains that relocation does not qualify as a formal action under 
1887 statute because, he rec:ogJl1lzmg an road as public when it is relocated is 
not the same as recognizing a road as public when it is first laid out. Opening Brief at 10-11. 
This is a distinction without a difference. 10 The County can find nothing in this Court's 
9 The petition referenced "the plat of the town of Gibbonsville on file in the office of the District Recorder." 
This may have been the same Plat of Gibbonsville attached to the miners' petition of 1878 (Ex. 3, C-4 and C-5). See 
Ex. 5 (Findings at 5, Finding No. 28). Or it may have been another plat. It does not really matter. In any event, the 
depiction of Main Street and Percy Street matches the plat set out in Ex. 3, C-4, thus confirming that it is a reference 
to the same Main Street (which is also ACR). 
10 This Court has complained no fewer than 47 times about such pointless "distinctions without a 
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decisions that draws such a tine semantic line. Nor do the words of the statute demand that the 
recognition of the road as public be contemporaneous with when it is first "laid out." 
The County urges instead a functional reading of this statutory language consistent with 
the practical approach to the law of public access reflected in Farrell, Galli, and so many 
an 'VLL'V"~L declaration in the form recorded 
private property do not 
legal opinion, placement on a map, 
statute aelnallas formal action and recording by the 
recorded order recognizing the 
vaU.VB. It 
IS constructed the county, 
the county (as in Farrell), or upon 
The formal, recorded action by the 
alteration of the course satisfies 
nll!-S{)Ulll versus east-west non-issue. 
mistaken reference 
1892 to one-paragraph summary of the County's action 
approvmg relocation PVLLU,,"'H the Clerk (Ex. C-9) incorrectly describes 
the orientation of the roads in petition his brief, Mr. Sopatyk says, "The 
petition to a Main Street running east-west a Percy Street running north-south .... " 
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Opening Brief at 11. This misstates the record. II The 1892 petition (Ex. C-8) says nothing 
about direction. As noted in the County's Findings: "The drawing is not marked to show which 
direction is north. As depicted, the longer street (Main Street) is shown on the horizontal axis, 
while the shorter Percy Street is on a vertical It appears to have been drawn in this fashion 
to fit Main Street into longer horizontal available on the page for the drawing. 
is supported by testimony of the 
Benedict. L to L 16 2004 Hearing). 
other words, north have been to the left on the petition. Apparently the clerk 
was to the top of the page, as it 
as north 
Street 
minor error IS legal consequence. ACR is where it always has 
been. That 1878 Main Street running north-south along Anderson 
and They are depicted just the same on the 1892 
petition (Ex. plausible conclusion is that the 1892 petition describing Main 
Street and Percy Gibbonsville to the same streets with the same names as in the 
1878 plat 
''''l,\,..<>hrlr complains: is no evidence that in July 1892 the term 
"Main Street" to running east-west through Gibbonsville." Opening 
Briefat 11 Supp. Sopatyk's Opening Brief Below at 14-15. This makes no sense. It 
! I This is another instance in which Mr. Sopatyk has persisted in misstating the record, despite the fact that 
the error was pointed out during the judicial review below. SUpp. c.R., Sopatyk's Opening Brief Below at 14, 
County's Response Brief Below at 18-19. 
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was not until several years later that the town was moved to the east and east-west Percy Street 
became the new Main Street 
This timing is well documented. The record reports in several places that in 1897 and 
1898, placer mining undermined part of the original Gibbonsville Townsite. Indeed, this 
",,,u'V •• n is what precipitated the emergency trip to Washington, to get President 
(The Golden at 81); 
Theodore Roosevelt creating the 
Gibbonsville on October 30, 1901 is set out in The President's action, however, 
carne too LJU'JUlo'J-l damage mining to necessitate the 
east 
was rermnleo new (The that 
Will Not Die), also found at But this did not occur until sometime on or after 1898. 
Also see, 15-C (Over the Back Fence). the reference to Main Street in 1 must 
original Main Street, also known as 
(4) Recording of the plat-another non-issue. 
Mr. Sopatyk persists another pointless quibble he presented first to the District Court. 
It is difficult to understand exactly what his but appears to think it is of some 
consequence that the 1892 petition refers to "the plat of the town of Gibbonsville on file in the 
office of the District Recorder." Opening Brief at 11; Supp. Sopatyk's Opening Brief 
Below at 14. Most likely, the 1892 petition was referring to the 1878 plat discussed above (Ex. 
3, Conceivably some other plat had been created, though none is in the record. But this 
makes no difference. The 1887 statute does not require recording of a plat; it only requires 
recording of the formal decision recognizing the road as public. The decision documents (Ex. 3, 
and C-9) are produced from the official records of the County. Mr. Sopatyk does not dispute 
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that they were recorded. Mr. Sopatyk's statement that the statute is not satisfied "because we do 
not know what plat was recorded with the District Recorder" (Opening Brief at 1 Supp. C.R., 
Sopatyk's Opening Brief Below at 15) simply makes no sense. 
(5) Maintenance is not required for an official declaration. 
Finally, Mr . .... nr''''Hrv claims that fonnal action County in 1892 was inadequate 
is no " Opening Brief at 12; Supp. 
Opening at 1 Sopatyk continues to confuse fonnal declaration 
prescriptive use, discussed below. Though they derive from the same statute, these are 
was established by prescriptive use. 
Public use 
1893. 
was sufficient to create a public road prior to 
same 1887 statute discussed above provides an alternative method of road creation. 12 
is reflected in the underlined portion of the statute: 
laid out as highways, order of a Board 
Commissioners, and all roads used as such for a period of five 
years, are highways. 
Rev. Stat. of Idaho Terr. § 851 887) (emphasis shows "prescriptive use" portion of statute). 13 
Until the statute was amended in 1893 to add a maintenance requirement, the only 
requirement was a showing of five years of public use. As discussed above in section at page 
12 In the judicial review before the District Court, Lemhi County withdrew its Finding No. 56 (Ex. 5 
(Findings at 8), which also premised prescriptive use on the 1864 and 1885 statutes. Supp. C.R., County's Response 
Brief Below at 21 n.23. The County also acknowledges that the reference in Finding No. 52 (Ex. 5 (Findings at 8) 
to a two-year use requirement is inaccurate. The inaccuracy in these fmdings is of no consequence whatsoever to 
the ultimate decision reached by the County with respect to prescriptive use, which is based solely on the 1887, 
1893, and modem versions of the statute. 
13 This 1887 statute is the operative statute upon which the County relies. Ex. 5 (Findings at 8, Finding No. 
54); Supp. c.R., County's Response Brief Below at 21. It is unclear why Mr. Sopatyk discusses an 1885 statute in 
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9 (blanket declaration), ACR was used by tbe public at least 1878 (the year of the miners' 
petition for a townsite saying that the road should be "left open") and served mines in existence 
as early as 1 Other evidence in the record shows other mines served by the road in operation 
on or before 1888. 14 The 1896 field notes the placer claims also document settlement along 
the 
1''''''>I'>''f1(;) ••• note the a 60 
foot wide road running north. . .. Not only does it mention the 
it mentions multiple saloons, etc. along the course of 
the claim--especially course near the south end." 
(Benedict Summary at 1) (emphasis omitted). 
record shows town Gibbonsville continued to thrive for many years 
thereafter. 
3, 
town of Gibbonsville was named John 
Gibbons who defeated Chief Joseph's Nez Perce warriors at the 
battle of the Big Hole in 1877, the year gold was discovered. The 
Townsite was created by an act of Congress, and in July, 1899, 
was patented by Judge Steel. At that time, 1899, there were 29 
business houses with improvements worth $36,000 and the 
population was 450. During the boom years, it had reached about 
3,000. 
(The Ghost Town that Will Not Die), also found at continued to 
even after the Gibbonsville Townsite was moved to the east, along Dahlonega Creek-IS 
14 The fifth page of Ex. 4, P-4 contains a recorded statement by Frank W. Hunt dated April 27, 1888 
describing the Mountain Top and other mines in existence as of that date. The Mountain Top is shown in the map at 
Ex. 4, P-8 and is plainly accessible only by ACR. 
The U.S.G.S. publication, Geology and Ore Deposits at 133 (Ex. 3, C-20-C), describes the Clara Morris 
group as having produced $250,000 "at intervals from 1888 and 1908." The Clara Morris claim also appears in the 
map at Ex. 4, P-8 and is also plainly accessed by ACR. As discussed above in section I.A at page 9, the Clara 
Morris appears to have been located as early as 1877. 
15 "This deeding of town site by the president is simply the culmination of the problems created by placer 
mining along Anderson Creek Road-the original Main Street: the washouts, the creation of the Placer Hole from 
mining and washouts, and the breaking of the trestle. The original plan for the town development had been 
undermined (no pun intended) by the mining efforts of those with placer claims along Anderson Creek. This does 
not mean that the Anderson Creek Road was no longer used: it was used to access mining claims, there were cabins 
along the road (see affidavit information), the road is designated on subsequent maps, and was used for logging 
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This is hardly surprising. While the town moved, the mines and mills served by ACR did not 
move. All evidence, and the fact that the road is still there today (although much impaired by the 
closure caused by Mr. Sopatyk), demonstrates that ACR was used by the public long after it was 
Gibbonsville's Main Street. 
(2) After 1893, both public use and maintenance can be shown. 
1 r>r"<>~"f>n statute was arrlerlOf;Q to requirement 
maintenance. 1 Idaho at 1 1 (then codified at Rev. Stat. Idaho 
§ 1; codified today as amended at Idaho Code 40-109(5) and 40-202(3». 
course, IS no to oernOllSU'ate it 
dernolllstnlted hpT,rH'p 1 (,,",P'<>1'11'," can be established even public 
mallm:enam~e V'V'VU<U'V a requirement. 
Evidence of public maintenance is found the was included in Road 
District No. which received regular road maintenance funding. 3, 8-A, 8-
5 (Findings at Findings These records, by and 
large, do not reflect exactly which road was worked. However, the fact that ACR (then a 
F,J.U,U"' .. UH "wagon road" accessing numerous mines) was included within the district is a 
uv~",,~a basis to infer that work was on to extent required. 16 
purposes in the 1940s (see Marcus Jordan information), and according to affidavit statements continues to be an 
important aspect of Gibbonsville." Ex. 3, (Benedict Summary at 11). See also testimony of Dr. Benedict (Exhibit 1, 
p. 44, n. 15-25, p. 48, n. 11-20 (Tr. 2004 Hearing») and her reference to an 1899 plat of a portion of the Gibbonsville 
Mining District (Ex. 3, C-12), which continues to depict ACR after washout of approximately 1897. 
16 In any event, it is not necessary to show that maintenance occurred every year or throughout the entire 
course of the road. "Such maintenance need only consist of work and repairs that are reasonably necessary .... " 
Roberts v. Swim, 117 Idaho 9, 16,784, P.2d 339, 346 (1990). "It is not necessary for the county to do work upon a 
road that does not need work to keep it in repair or to put it in condition for the public to travel." State v. Berg, 28 
Idaho 724, 724, 155 P.968, 969 (1916) (fmding road creation through five years of public use despite no evidence of 
public maintenance). "Maintenance need only be work and repairs that are reasonably necessary; it is not necessary 
maintenance be performed in each of the five consecutive years or through the entire length of the road." Ada 
County Highway Dist. v. Total Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 366, 179 P.3d 323,329 (2008). "Very few 
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maintenance also may be inferred from the fact that the road survived for so many decades. 
This conclusion rpC'llr,'ltTl maintenance is supported by testimony of the County's 
historian, Dr. Benedict. 91,1. 20 to p. 93,1. 7 (Tr. 2004 Hearing). 17 The record also 
contains ample eVl<1ellce continued public use. IS 
D. ACR became a public road by common law dedication when the 
mineral patent issued. 
In the course 
to 
followed. 19 
Common law dedication occurs when a patent issues 
referencing a plat or other description showing the road. 
estate development, roads may be dedicated to the public 
50-1301 to governing 
addition, however, this Court has 
as common 
common law aelatc:anon 
even when statutory procedures are not 
roads require work throughout their entire length. Our statute does not require work to be done upon a part of a 
highway not needing work" Gross v. McNutt, 4 Idaho 286, 289, 38 P. 935, 936 (1894). 
17 Mr. Sopatyk mischaracterizes this testimony in his Opening Brief at 13. He states: "In fact, the expert 
retained on behalf of the County, testified that her research into the matter revealed that the County 
did not expend any money to maintain ACR." Dr. Benedict said no such thing. Instead, she explained, consistent 
with the County's Findings, that the evidence does not state which roads within Road District No.6 funds were 
spend on, and that this is not uncommon. 
18 Dr. Benedict's summary of evidence (Ex. 3 (Benedict Summary», Dr. Benedict's summary of public 
comments from the 2004 validation hearing (Ex. 5 (Exhibit C to Findings», and the extensive public testimony 
discussed in footnote 44 at page 40. 
19 For instance, in Pullin v. Victor, 103 Idaho 879,655 P.2d 86 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982), a developer filed a 
plat in 1909 dedicating a road, which remained unbuilt until the 1960s. Homeowners challenged the 1909 
dedication on the basis that it had never been accepted by the city, as required by the platting statute. The Court of 
Appeals ruled that common law dedication does not require such compliance. 
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At core, a common law dedication simply requires an "offer" of dedication by the 
original owner (often but not necessarily in the form a plat filing) and "acceptance" reflected 
in sales of property pursuant thereto.2o This Court has offered this summary of the doctrine: 
When an owner of land plats the land, files the plat for record, and 
sells lots by to the a dedication of public 
areas indicated by the plat is accomplished. 
1 1 v. 14 Idaho 
1 908). 




1 when the federal government issues a 
homestead patent or Hr""TT"'''' description a road, that road is deemed to have 
LV'-."' .... , government. 
common law .... ""UV'-'LL'"·U occurred when the federal government issued Mineral Patent 
No. 28383 Davis et al. in 1897. 4, S-5). patent was issued 
retc:::rel1ce to a Mineral ""'Mr"" 1187 (Ex. C-l, included 
within running adjacent to Anderson Creek. Likewise, the 
field notes reference at (feet 148): "Anderson Creek, 3 feet wide, courses S.E. 
southwesterly. Road, 60 wide, courses North." The road is also referenced in the field notes 
to the adjacent Mineral 1170 (Ex. 3, C-l) at page 69 (feet 210,270, and 351.4): 
20 This sounds a bit like the offer and acceptance provided for under R. S. 2477, discussed in section I.E( 1) 
at page 25. Indeed, common law dedication may well be a proper means of "accepting" the federal grant. 
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"Edge of road, course northerly. Edge of road, course southerly" [appears to be changed to 
"northerly."] and at page 68 (feet 187): "Edge of wagon road, course southwest and northwest." 
Mr. Sopatyk disputes none of this. Instead, he rests his argument that no common law 
dedication occurred on two points, discussed below?l 
not patents. 
(2) Homestead patents versus mineral patents: A meaningless 
distinction. 
that only extended common law dedication to homestead patents, 
is true, but the same logic Farrell applied to homestead patents applies 
to mineral patents, convey the entire fee. As the Court said in Farrell, "The 
go',enrnn,ent was it filed and recorded a valid plat. That is 
part of the owner to dedicate public areas of the 
to Worley Highway Dist. V. Yacht 
775 P.2d 111, 116 (1989»). Nothing in the 
limited to its facts (homestead patents) as urged 
was clear. The homesteading, mining, 
west and creating a network of public roads. This 
the common doctrine to a 
sum, mineral patents involve conveyances by deed based on an 
Ha.yu,,",u representation the original owner that a road will be made available. Thus, when the 
21 Mr. Sopatyk made these same points in his argument to the District Court, and the County responded. 
Following a pattern, Mr. Sopatyk makes them again here, without so much as acknowledging (much less responding 
to) the County's discussion of why he is wrong. 
22 In Farrell, the Court re-stated the requirements, speaking broadly in terms of offer and acceptance. "The 
elements ofa common law dedication as established by Pullin v. Victor are '(1) an offer by the owner, clearly and 
unequivocally indicating by his words or acts evidencing his intention to dedicate the land to public use, and (2) an 
acceptance of the offer by the public. '" Farrell, 138 Idaho at 384, 64 P.3d at 310 {quoting Pullin v. Victor, 103 
Idaho 879, 881,655 P.2d 86, 88 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982». 
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federal government issues a patent deed pursuant to a map depicting a road, that road is deemed 
to have been dedicated to the public by the federal government.23 
(3) Lots sold: A misunderstanding of the rule. 
Next, Mr. Sopatyk complains, Opening Brief at 19, that there is no showing that lots have 
sold with retlere:nce to the plat this is not true.24 More importantly, however, Mr. 
statement holding in Farrell. 
lots is met by the issuance of the patent itself. 
United States plays the role of the real estate developer. The patentee 
a patent on a land 
IS 
a a subject patent 
conveyed the Farrell Court explained: "That the road was 
clearly marked and "'4U'V''-'''-' patent is sufficient to create an offer to dedicate a 
public of homestead patents a valid acceptance a 
common law dedication." Farrell, 138 Idaho at 385,64 P.3d at 311. 
ACR is an R.S. 2477 road. 
ACR was created through compliance with state road creation 
law. 
One of the more interesting areas of road law deals with the creation of rights-of-way 
under a federal statute, section 8 of the Mining Act of 1866, commonly referred to as R.S. 2477. 
23 Common law dedications often occur without words of dedication. In other words, the plat does not need 
to state, "I hereby dedicate this road." As noted above, a dedication may be predicated on "words or acts." Farrell, 
138 Idaho at 384, 64 P.3d at 310. Typically, the "act" is the depicting of the road on a plat. "[T]he act of filing and 
recording a plat or map is sufficient to establish the intent on the part of the owner to make a donation to the public." 
Farrell, 138 Idaho at 384,64 P.3d at 310; Ex. 5 (Findings at 9, Finding No. 59). 
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In this post-Civil War era legislation, the United States government encouraged the creation of a 
road network over its vast western estate, forever granting to local authorities ownership of these 
rights-of-way. As a result, western states now exercise considerable control over roads located 
on federal lands and fonner federal lands. 




Wilderness Alliance 761 Oth 2005): 
be itfurther enacted, the right way for the construction 
highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses, is hereby 
granted. 
statute was to create a Uv''''-''''UL'UHJlF, offer to the public to 
to to such rights-of-way to the local 
with law. 25 
its own tenns, applies only to roads public lands, not reserved for 
public uses." Thus, the threshold question in every R.S. 2477 claim was the land over which 
the road lies unreserved public land at the time the road was created? There is no dispute that the 
land containing the ACR left the public domain in 1897.26 The evidence discussed above shows 
that ACR was in existence well before 1897.27 
24 Again, Mr. Sopatyk misstates the record. For example, Ex. 3, C-6-A is a recording of a town lot sold in 
Gibbonsville "joining the Millsite of Strickland & Davis on the East-line fronting the County-road rurming North 
100 feet .... " There was only one county road at the time, and certainly only one running north. It was ACR. 
25 One might ask, ifR.S. 2477 simply looks to state law to determine whether a road has been created, what 
did the federal statute accomplish? The answer is simple: it allowed state roads to be created on federal property. 
See discussion in section IILC at page 34. 
26 The County found as follows: "The land upon which Anderson Creek Road lies remained in the public 
domain until February 20, 1897, the date on which a receiver's certificate was issued to William Davis, et a1. 
demonstrating that the application for patent and all accompanying fees and documents were properly filed in 
connection with Mineral Entry No. 450." Ex. 5 (Findings at 11, Finding No. 72(A»). Mr. Sopatyk concurs. 
Opening Brief at 17. 
27 Mr. Sopatyk appears to be confused on this point. He refers to the law in existence as of the year the 
land left the public domain. "The Commissioners have the burden to show compliance with the road creation 
statutes in existence in 1897." Opening Brief at 17. Of course, the County has shown that. But it has also shown 
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Although R.S. 2477 is a federal statute, the law is well settled that state law governs how 
the federal offer is accepted. Galli, 146 Idaho at 1 160, 191 P.3d at 233, ("State law 
governs whether a highway has been created under R.S. 2477."). 
That state law rule is easily stated: "Under 2477 a public road may be created under 
the state road creation statute or where there a positive act of acceptance by the local 
1 Idaho at at 310 119 
at CHBltlOllS omitted». 
The discussion above also shows that ACR has complied with four forms of Idaho road 
OJLUHU',"' legislation, LV .. ,LU,", approval, use, and common 
one is to 1 left 
public domain. 
(2) the alternative, ACR met the more "lax" test for R.S. 2477. 
(a) The 1878 townsite petition. 
strict compliance with state road were not enough, ACR also meets the more 
relaxed standard of "some positive act or acts on the part of the proper public authorities." Kirk 
v. Schultz, Idaho 278,282-83, 119 266,268 (l this said, "[T]he second 
method requiring any 'positive act' is more than the requirements set forth in the state road 
creation statute." Farrell, 138 Idaho at 384, P.3d at 310. 
compliance with the state law in existence in 1881 (blanket legislation) and 1887 (prescription and formal action), 
any of which is snfficient to create an RS. 2477 road. In other words, the road may be created under state law in 
effect at any time prior to the land leaving the public domain. 
28 Since acceptance of a road under RS. 2477 is governed by state law, it would seem that either state 
statutory or common law (common law dedication) would suffice. It is not clear why this Court in Farrell and Galli 
referred only to statutory law or "some positive act." The County suggests the more logical rule is statutory or 
common law or some positive act. In any event, there are plenty of legal theories to justify recognition of ACR 
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The County relied on the 1878 townsite petition (which said that ACR should be "left 
open") to establish the factual premise that the road was in existence and used by the public for 
purposes of road creation under (1) the 1881 blanket legislation, (2) prescriptive use, and (3) 
common law dedication. The County did claim that the 1878 townsite petition constituted 
formal 1 However, the County found that the 
authorities" sufficient to satisfy 
more 
... ""nu,.., for two reasons. First he says: "The miners' 
can take a positive act to accept the 
more 
"some miners' committee may been 
informal one it was sufficiently authoritative to 
secure the approval ..," .... '-'l.H Roosevelt himself when the townsite was 
approved 1 Years at 8 Surely that meets the test of "some 
positive act or acts on n .. nn"", public authorities" set out in Farrell, 138 Idaho at 
P.3d at 31 was 1 This is how things were done on Idaho's 
where plat was recorded: "[T]he 1878 plat 
at was never recorded with the County, but 'filed and 
recorded Mining District Official Ledger. '" Opening Brief at 21. This is even 
more pointless. The "positive test not require any recording, so there is not much point 
29 In the course of this discussio~ Mr. Sopatyk contends: "In fact, it was testified at the September 27, 
2004, hearing that ACR was not included in the township survey submitted and approved in 1901. 2004 Transcript, 
p. 98, 1I. 7-19." Opening Brief at 18. Be that as it may, there is ample evidence of ACR on other maps, documents, 
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in debating where it was recorded. In any avoiding arguments over such things as the 
technicalities of recording wa<; the whole point of the and Farrell decisions.3o 
In any 
public 
(b) The 1892 relocation petition. 
even if the Court deems the 1878 miners' petition insufficient to meet the 
IS the 1 road relocation petition and approval by Lemhi 
51 is no credible argument 
--0""""'" positive recoguizing the existence of ACR as a 
',,''''''''-'(fV does not even address this point. 
NO EVIDENCE OF ABANDONMENT. 
road abandonment requires affirmative proof of both non-use 
non-maintenance. 
In order to "IJ'aVJ,U decision validating ACR, this Court must conclude not 
that created as a public road, but that it has not been abandoned. There 
are two types Idaho: formal abandonment (by official act) and passive 
non-maintenance over time. is no evidence 
no Sopatyk contends, however, that passive abandonment 
has occurred. 
Idaho's abandonment statute was adopted in 1887. It provided in full: road not 
worked or used the period years ceases to be a highway for any purpose whatever. 
and testimony. In any event, what happened in 1901 has nothing to do with the question of whether the 1878 
townsite petition constituted "some positive act." 
30 In Farrell, the plaintiff contended that Lemhi County's decision to accept the road was not properly 
recorded. The Court brushed aside the statutory requirement for recording. The Court's more "lax" standard 
allowed the Court to fmd that the County's acceptance of a miners' petition for the road "pasted in the old leather-
bound County book" constituted "a clear manifestation of an intent to accept a road"-irrespective of whether it was 
properly recorded. Farrell, 138 Idaho at 384,64 P.3d at 310. 
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Rev. Stat. ofIdaho Terr. § 852 (1887) (later codified at Idaho Code § 40-203(4» (repealed by 
1108, 1993 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 41 § 1).31 
The phrase "not worked or used" might sound like either would be sufficient to work an 
abandonment. However, this Court has made clear that one asserting abandonment must "prove 
the negative" with reeara to both the and "maintenance" elements. Taggart v. Highway 
115 again 2002, "Therefore, 
IS a non-rna]ln",u~,u~'~ and non-use 
abandonment. v. o/Lemhi County, 138 Idaho 378, 385, 64 P.3d 
311 
not apply to 
two reasons. 
there an argument the passive abandonment statute only applies to roads 
created by preseription.32 is correct, is not subject to passive abandonment because 
well as by prescription). 
Second, it is settled that roads C'TP,,,,t,,.rI by common law dedication are not subject to 
passive abandonment. Farrell, 1 Idaho at 386,64 P.3d at 3 shown above, ACR was 
by common dedication patent 1 (see section at page 
31 The law was substantially limited in 1963 making it inapplicable to roads like ACR accessing 
public lands) and repealed in 1993. Those changes are not relevant here, becanse Mr. Sopatyk is asserting 
abandonment prior to 1963. 
32 The Legislature amended the passive abandonment statute in 1963 to expressly provide that it is 
applicable only to roads created by "prescription" (referring to the public use road creation provision). There is an 
argument that the 1963 amendment merely codified existing law. After an, it makes some intuitive sense that the 
Legislature wonld have intended that abandonment by non-use apply only to roads created by use. This conclusion 
is supported by the outcome in Taggart v. Highway Bd.for N. Latah County, 115 Idaho 816, 817, 771 P.2d 37,38 
(1989). In Taggart, the Court declined to apply the passive abandonment statute to a road because the road had been 
created by formal action, not by "prescription." This occurred despite the fact that the alleged period of non-use and 
non-maintenance was prior to 1963. Unfortunately, the Court failed to explain its reasoning, or even to discuss the 
1963 amendment. Consequently, it is difficult to tell if this was the intended ruling, or a mistake based on 
unfamiliarity with the history of the statute. 
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Thus, the only way to abandon a road created by common law dedication is by formal 
declaration of abandonment by the county, and there has been none. 
C. Mr. Sopatyk carries the burden of proof on abandonment. 
In any event, Mr. Sopatyk has the burden of proving abandonment: 
Upon establishment a public road by prescription, the burden 
shifts to the opponents of the public road to show a subsequent 
ab.:m(lo1J!mc:mt or extinguishment of those rights. 
of Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 71 728, P.3d 863, 
reinforced the point the Farrell case decided the same 
once a or public road is proven the hlllrr!p'n 
abandonment of that road by non-use and non-
l1ACUll1.vH.cun,v 1S on party asserting abandonment. 
to state IS no 
(2002) 
duty to point to evidence proving non-use and non-
maintenance. 
Court said 
the quantum of use required to avoid abandonment is very low. 
of use to prevent a finding 
abandonment, a showing of "any continuous use no matter how 
slight, by the public, is sufficient." 
1 Idaho at 64 P.3d at 311. 
Sopatyk offers no evidence of abandonment. 
the 
County hired an historian to search out evidence of abandonment. She found none. 
found no evidence of road abandonment in my historical research." Ex. 3, (Benedict 
Summary at 1).33 
33 ACR mayor may not have been moved slightly to avoid the washout caused by placer mining in 1897 or 
1898, but any such movement is legally inconsequential. The record does not reflect any re-alignment of ACR. But 
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Mr. Sopatyk offered none, either. Instead evidence, Mr. Sopatyk ofters this statement 
to prove non-use: "As discussed throughout this Brief, there is no supported evidence of use on 
ACR." Opening Brief at 14; Supp. C.R., Sopatyk's Opening Brief Below at 17. Suffice it to 
that is not evidence, and this bald assertion not come close to meeting his burden of 
complete non-use five years. Despite having had this 
footnote at Response Brief 
Mr. Sopatyk still does not £,<"'·1,..P<2 the burden of proof on 
abandonment. Indeed, avoids the subject altogether. 
Sopatyk that no 
m,nnterlanlce was .... t>'rtr..rrn maintenance records can 
1920 1 
Opening at 1 Opening at 17. support 
assertion, he offers an affidavit of himself saying that reviewed the road maintenance records 
and that was no mention of maintenance or for maintenance or use of any kind 
regarding a 'Anderson Creek Road. '" 4, S-l (Sopatyk Affidavit at p. 1, ~ 7). Again, this 
falls short Mr. Sopatyk's burden of affirmatively proving that no maintenance occurred. 
even if it were necessary to move the road as a result of the hydraulic mining, this does not change its status as a 
public road. In Farrell, opponents of a public road sought to prove non-use based on the fact that the road had been 
largely re-aligned along a creek bed, with substantial stretches jumping from one side of the creek to the other. The 
Supreme Court squarely rejected this theory: "After 1955, the Ranch Owners allege that the road was not used 
because it was relocated by the Forest Service. '" The Ranch Owners based the majority of their non-use 
abandoument claim on the non-use of the portions of the road abandoned because of realigmnent. Abandonment of 
the old portions of a realigned road, however, is not evidence of non-use or abandonment of the realigned new road 
unless the changes actually change the identity of the road originally laid out." Farrell, 138 Idaho at 386, 64 P.3d at 
312. This ruling reflects the practical reality in Idaho that mountain roads are routinely re-aligned in response to 
washouts and other events. This is consistent with a 1932 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. Central Pac. Ry. 
Co. v. Alameda County, 284 U.S. 463,467 (1932). The federal district court in Idaho recently cited this case as 
controlling authority on this point. United States of America v. Boundary County, Case No. CV98-253-N-EJL, at 5 
(0. Idaho, Memorandum Decision and Order, Aug. 28, 2000); accord, Sheridan County v. Spiro, 697 P.2d 290,296 
(Wyo. 1985); Schultz v. Dept. of the Army, u.s., 10 F.3d 649,655 (9th Cir. 1993). 
This is apparently a non-issue. Mr. Sopatyk has not raised it. The County includes this footnote out of an 
abundance of caution, and with apologies to the Court, to ensure that it remains a non-issue. 
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the facc circumstantial evidence that public m~lln1:en;an(:e occurred (discussed above in 
section LC(2) at page 21), Mr. Sopatyk must do more than say he looked in some books and did 
not find specific proof of public maintenance. As the District Court noted, proving non-
maintenance is not easy,34 But that is Mr. Sopatyk's burden, and he has not met it. 
MISCELLANEOUS ARGUMENTS HAVE NO MERIT. 
a litany of throw-away arguments, all 
were ""''',1'"v simply them again on this ':>,," .. ,vu\.!. appeal, 
to reS1DOlJl<1 to the arguments presented below. The County addresses m 
tum. 
County's decision does not constitute a taking or due process 
violation. 
argument (Opening Brief at 20-21) that the validation of ACR violates his 




was not his and there was no constitutional violation. the validation 
be no ,,"Vj,'.:>lHUUVU£tl 
The County's Findings were documented and supported by the 
record. 
Mr. Sopatyk contends (Opening at -22) that the County's Findings were 
so. The record provides fun support for 
34 "Admittedly, in making this ftnding [of non-abandonment] the Commissioners to some extent relied on 
the absence of proof in proving a negative i.e., non-use and/or non-maintenance. This ftnding implicates respective 
burdens of proof." R., p. 30 (Memorandum Decision at 7). 
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decision to validate ACR. For the existence of ACR after the washout, see discussion 
in footnote 15 at page 20. For continued use to the present times, see footnote 18 at page 22.35 
At another point, Mr. Sopatyk complains that the County should have looked at other 
evidence. Opening Brief at The items he lists (tax assessments and deed documents) have 
to In this was an adversarial proceeding, and 
the ACR encroaches on federal lands. 
land. Opening Brief at The 
em;;roacJ111lem is a map submitted by 
encroachment. the 
was ~HU'H"~"', nor was of 
35 Mr. further claims in his Brief that not "citing authority for" each particular 
paragraph in the Findings, "the Commissioners are only substituting their prejudices and desire in place of actual 
facts." Opening Brief at 22. For example, Mr. Sopatyk states there is no citation to the record for Finding No. 43 
that ACR ran all the way into Montana. Opening Brief at 21. This is another of Mr. Sopatyk's misleading 
assertions as there is no requirement that the Commissioners cite authority for every conclusion. Further, it is 
unnecessary for the Commissioners to do so as they already acknowledged at the outset of the Findings that the 
entire record before the Commission was considered. Ex. 5, (Findings at 3, Finding Nos. 12 and 15). The record 
contains clear support for the County decision, including the conclusion that ACR existed to the Montana border. 
4, P-9 (1981 newspaper clipping indicating "citizens of Gibbonsville have just completed the surveyor a wagon 
road ... into Montana ... via Anderson Creek and Three Mile."». 
36 Here is the colloquy between counsel for Mr. Sopatyk and Judge Moss: 
MR.SAETRUM: And it was interesting ... that there is never an assessment for 
the owners of the Anderson Creek placers for any roadwork, yet if indeed that 
was a public road, there had to be an assessment. 
THE COURT: Why do you say there had to be? 
MR.SAETRUM: Well, Ms. Benedict, who was the County's historian, said that 
if it was a public road, the people living on it would be assessed to maintain it. 
THE COURT: Is that an assumption or is that a law? 
MR. SAETRUM: That was her understanding as to how it worked at the time. 
THE COURT: But we don't have any ordinances on that effect, anything else 
indicating that just that's what she believed? 
MR. SAETRUM: Correct. 
p. 4, L 19 to p. 5, 1. 12. 
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Whatever the case, the encroachment issue is improper and irrelevant. It is raised too 
late37 and, in any event, Mr. Sopatyk does not speak for the Forest Service and does not have 
standing to raise this concern. lfthe Forest Service objects to this road, it has the ability to 
protect its interests. fact, however, the Service has taken the opposite position. The 
R.S. 
Salmon-Challis expressly supported recognition of ACR as an 
response to letter of August 24, 2004 related to the 
'1"111" .... "1'.'1"1 Creek Road, I would like to express the Salmon-Challis 
road. 
support for continued public access along this 
Anderson Creek Road indicates the 
road was established prior to the establishment 
of the National Forest. 
appears to qualify designation as a 
public road under RS2477. 
Although the road tenninates on the National 
Forest, it largely passes through and provides access 
to public land. 
This road is not and has not been considered a 
portion of the National Forest road system. 
road has not been maintained by the Forest 
Service and is unlikely to be a priority for our 
available road maintenance funds. 
these findings, and the fact that the Salmon-Challis 
is one of the landowners along this road, we believe the best 
public would be served by designation of the 
Anderson Creek Road as a County Road in order to provide 
continued access to and through this area to the National Forest. 
Wood). That should put this argument to rest. 
37 Mr. Sopatyk failed to raise the issue of encroachment during the validation proceedings and "[r]eview on appeal 
is limited to those issues raised before the administrative tribunal." Johnson v. Blaine County, 146 Idaho 916, 920, 
204 P.3d 1127, 1131 (2009). "[A]n appellate court will not decide issues presented for the first time on appeal," and 
this Court should not now entertain the encroachment argument. Id. (citing Balser v. Kootenai County Bd. of 
Comm'rs, 110 Idaho 37, 40, 714 P.2d 6,9 (1986)). 
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that matter, even if the Forest Service opposed the road, that would be of no 
consequence. RS. 2477 roads may be created on public land prior to the withdrawal of the land 
from the public domain.38 Indeed, that is the whole purpose ofRS. 2477. 
D. ACR was properly validated as 50-feet wide. 
Sopatyk ~ .. _,,.., .. ~ that fifty-foot width of ACR is too wide. Opening Brief at 24. 
the fifty-foot width is presumption established by Idaho statute and 
facts in the rp('nrrl is no official declaration or survey to the contrary, 
Idaho law uses a as a default Code § 40-605; Idaho Code § 40-231 39 
case 1 780 (1908), applied the 
in a case involving a public 
statute. Court held 
circumstances 
case, but is presumed to clearly indicate otherwise. This 
statute evidently nTrH'''''''''' the width a road is considered reasonably necessary for the 
convenience ofthe public generally." Meservey, 14 Idaho at 146,93 P. at 784. "Where there is 
no evidence mere user ....... "JL,,~. the presumption is not necessarily 
38 Mr. Sopatyk contends, "The County, however, cannot validate a road on federal ground." Opening Brief 
at 24 (citing French v. Sorensen, 113 Idaho 950,957,751 P.2d 98, 105 (1998». The French case was speaking 
about validation after the land was reserved. Obviously, that cannot be done. Equally obviously, R.S. 2477 roads 
can be validated on federal lands if the road became a public road before the land was reserved. To the extent ACR 
encroaches on public land, the United States, if it chose, could refuse to acknowledge such a validation absent a 
federal quiet title action. If necessary, a federal quiet title action could be pursued here. Given the federal 
government's express recognition that ACR qualifies as an R.S. 2477 road and desire to maintain public access via 
this road, that is unlikely to be necessary. 
39 Predecessors of this statute trace the 50-foot minimum back to territorial days. 1887 Revised Stat. of 
Idaho Territory, title VI, ch. II, § 932; 1885 Gen. Laws of the Territory ofIdaho, § 10 at page 165. 
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limited to the traveled path, but may be inferred to £>VT,,,,.,." to the ordinary width of highways 
.... ,,40 Meservy, 14 Idaho at 147,93 P. at 784. 
Moreover, the Court expressly adopted the common law of Utah, which holds that the 
road created by prescription encompasses the public's right "to use the whole tract as a highway, 
by widening and the exigencies of the 
public at Again, the Court emphasized the key point: 
it must statute the width of highways at not less than 
50 feet, and common PV,r>PT"lpr1PP that width no more than sufficient for the proper keeping 
Idaho at 1 P. at 785. 
prescription was also recognized in State v. Berg, Idaho 
1 years of public use, 
portion). 
The case Idaho 1088 (1961), demonstrates that 
IS ..... At..-"'" that the right for a public road may be substantially 
broader than C""'+<>f'A itself. The Idaho Supreme Court declared: "Mere non-user of a 
a highway over a period of years does not constitute an 
abandonment, or public from claiming the title and right to the use thereof" Rich, 83 
Idaho at at 1094. In this case, the state ofIdaho was authorized in widening and 
improving a cr'""''''''' even where the was to require the removal (without compensation) 
of a gas station owned by the defendant. 
Here, the record is replete with evidence that a width of 50 feet is appropriate for ACR. 
40 The tenn "user," by the way, is an arcane but correct tenn for "use." 
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Relevane 
"Road 60 ft. wide" (deseribing ACR) 
"Road 60 ft. wide" (describing ACR) 
"Main Street 75 wide" (deseribing ACR) 
"that the streets be (75) seventy-five teet 
(describing ACR) 
Obviously, ACR is currently much different both structurally and visually than it was 
over one hundred years Nevertheless, is entitled to validate the road based on its 
width and in accordance statutory presumption a fifty-foot width . 
..... 'U·"',,,,,, determined that validation of ACR is in the 
to 
was is not correct. 
laid out the two-step process for consideration of the 
Commission will determine whether 
Anderson Creek Road meets the requirements ofIdaho law as a public road or right-of-way 
today. that decision is the the Commission will next determine whether it is in 
the public mte:rest continue to be a or right-of-way." 
5 (Exhibit B to Findings, Notice at 1, 1, L 25 to p. 7 2004 Hearing). 
This two-step process is as contained a separate heading on the 
subject of public interest evaluation. un-nus", at 1 Findings Nos. 91, 92, 93). Another 
paragraph notes the key public 11'11",,,,,,""""1' {,1"1f""<MAn that ACR provides access to public land. Ex. 5 
(Findings at 7, Finding No. 44).41 In addition to these four paragraphs, the Findings incorporated 
41 Mr. Sopatyk claims in his brief that this rroding is not supported by the record. Opening Brief at 7. 
Again, not true. See bullet point 3 in the Letter of William A. Wood 3, C-3) (quoted in section m.c at page 
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Exhibit C which set out eight pages of summary of public interest testimony (Ex. 5 (Exhibit C to 
Findings at 1_8».42 
In comparison to the County's more detailed discussion on the merits, it must be admitted 
that these paragraphs provide only a limited discussion of the public interest. For whatever 
on Exhibit C for its discussion of public 
al1 ... aL.IVU statute ~""''-' , the County to "detennine whether 
validation of the the public interest and [to] enter an order." 
§ Planning is no requirement for 
decision. Idaho § 67-6535(b). In other 
together, the 
Findings Notice (Exhibit B to Findings) are 
sufficient to demonstrate that the matter and concluded that the public 
interest was satisfied. 
34). See also summary of statement of Doug Gupton 5 (Exhibit C to Findings at 4» and summary of 
statements of Mary and Roger Stover 5 (Exhibit C to Findings at 3». Apparently, Mr. Sopatyk believes that the 
County is to every statement in its Findings with citatious to the record. There is no such 
requirement. 
42 For example, see summary of statement of Doug Gupton 5 (Exhibit C to Findings at 4». ("testified 
as to the importance of the road for access to recreational areas on the Forest lands"); summary of statement of Dana 
Ortlieb (Ex. 5 at 4) ("spoke to the importance of keeping the road open"); summary of statement of Chloe A. Ross 
5 at 4) ("For years it has lent public access to Anderson Mountain, Keystone ridge, Smithy Creek, and many 
other favorite and well-known spots"; also important for "search and rescue"; "It is the usefulness of the road itself 
and the fact that if it were taken away the community and public would be robbed of a precious resource."); 
summary of statement by Keating Outfitters (Ex. 5 at 2) (ACR used for "accessing hunting and fishing areas for 
their clients"); summary of statement of Richard Shank (Ex. 5 at 2) ("access to Anderson Mountain and mountain 
recreation area and to Keystone Ridge"); summary of statement of Toby Friedman (Ex. 5 at 2) ("deep desire that it 
remain a public and open road just like it has always been"); summary of statement of Julia Pratt Randolph (Ex. 5 at 
182) ("husband and son-in-law also used the road at one point to rescue a woman"); summary of statements of Mary 
and Roger Stover (Ex. 5 at 3) ("used it over the course of the last 50 years for access to Forest Service grounds, 
recreation, motorcycle riding, walking, and fishing"); summary of statement of Norma Scarborough (Ex. 5 at 3) 
("used the road over the course of 54 liz years that she had lived there: horseback riding, walking, hiking, fishing"). 
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Idaho Code § 40-203A sets out the exclusive for overturning the County's decision. 
Failure to thoroughly describe its reasoning as to the public interest is not among them. The only 
question for this Court is whether the record, taken as a whole, contained sufficient "reliable, 
probative and substantial information" to support the County's decision to validate and whether 
the U'"""""'JlVU was of or clearly unwarranted exercise 
L,""VV1U amply C'H"' .... r'rt" the County's 
open. 44 example is 
;JU"UMJU'-'''U .. '',y National Forest quoted in section 
to ImmUlm2~e 
The allegation of bias "E>"'''''' 
and irrelevant. 
nrr,,,,p,rtu ,nt"pf"p'ct"c in the Gibbonsville area 
43 
nrH'tlPV,PT the Court were to find that the 
rpw.,PrI" would be to remand for a fuller explanation. 
After all, the Idaho 
IS 
alJ;an(10fl1Iliem 45 
a former commissioner is unfounded 
<It"t".'£'t"I''rI by the validation and 
eXt:,lanatlCm of its decision is inadequate, the 
44 In addition to the summary of public interest summarized in Exhibit C to the Findings, note 
the following direct testimony and exhibits: Testimony of Julia Randolph, Ex. I, p. 128, n. 15-23; Testimony of 
Mary Jordan Stover, Ex. 1, p.140, n. 17-21, p. 143, n. p. n. 16-18; Testimony of Roger Stover, Ex. 1, p. 
146, n. 15-21, p. 150,1. 19; Testimony of Doug Kelptin, Ex. 1, p.152, n. 17-25, p. 153,11. 1-7; Testimony of Bob 
Gervais, Ex. 1, p. 156,11.25, p. 157,11. 1-5, p. 160, n. p. 161, n. Testimony of Dana Roger Ortlieb, Ex. 
1, p. 161, U. 13-18, p. 164, n. 22-25, p. 165, n. Testimony of Norma Scarborough, Ex. 1, p. 172, n. 20-25; 
Testimony of Bob Vouvier, Ex. 1, p. 177, n. 18-25, p. 178,1. Letter of William A. Wood, Ex. 3, C-3; Notarized 
Letter from Marcus C. Jordan, Ex. 3, C-22-B; Affidavit of Larry Webb, Ex. 3, C-22-C; Affidavit of Robert 
Srenersen, Ex. 3, C-22-E; Notarized Statement of Sue Ann Keating, Ex. 3, C-22-F; Notarized Statement of Richard 
Shank, Ex. 3, C-22-G; Affidavit of Toby Friedman, Ex. 3, C-22-H; Affidavit of Alfred Stenersen, Ex. 3, C-22-I; 
Affidavit of Barbara Stenersen, Ex. 3, C-22-J; Letter from Norma Scarborough, Ex. 4, P-20. 
45 S.B. 242, 1963 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 267, § 1 (then codified at Idaho Code § 40-104; later codified at 
Idaho Code § 40-203(4); repealed by S.B. 1108 in 1993). 
RESPONSE BRIEF 
1007368_39.5720.9 
Page 40 of 103 
improvement of ACR." Opening Brief at 46 This allegation is without merit for four reasons. 
First, the factual premise is wrong. Former Commissioner Proksch had no improper interest in 
the ACR validation proceeding.47 Next, as a technical matter, the statute Mr. Sopatyk alleges 
was violated does not apply to validation proceedings.48 Third, even if Mr. Proksch were biased 
(and was did not cast the Oe(~10Jmg vote, and no remand is appropriate under Floyd v. 
46 Mr. Sopatyk also states, "Additionally, it appears that Mr. Proksch did not raise his property interests to 
the Commissioners during the time they considered the record in rendering the January 24, 2005, Decision" 
Opening Brief (referencing Ex. 4, S-C (Proksch Deposition, p. 37, 11. 10-15, p. 38, 1. 3». This is yet another blatant 
misstatement of the record. The only testimony was that, at the time the deposition was taken, Mr. Proksch did not 
recall what disclosures had been made. 
Mr. Sopatyk also states, "First, the petition for validation was initially filed by a fonner County Prosecutor 
ULJ'vunH< Brief at 25 (citing Ex. 1, p. 266, 11. 9-15 (Tr. 2004 Hearing)). The reference is not to testimony of a 
witness but to a statement by counsel for Mr. in which counsel speculates about "the genesis of this entire 
process. Ex. ,p. 266, L 18 2004 There is no testimonial evidence to support counsel's speculation. 
Again, Mr. Sopatyk has misled the Court. 
Mr. Proksch owns two parcels that Mr. Sopatyk alleges will be benefited by validation of ACR. Mr. 
Proksch owns a one-quarter interest in an estate parcel with his three sisters. The property is about one to one and 
one-half miles from ACR. Ex. 4, S-C (Proksch Deposition, p. 9, LIS, p. 11, 11. 5-6, p. 26, 11. 10-12). In addition, he 
and his wife own a property near Ditch Creek. Ex. 4, S-C (Proksch Deposition, p. 9, 11. 11-21, p. 11,11.5-6, p. 15,11. 
1-2). The Ditch Creek property is even further from ACR, about four to six miles away. Ex. 4, S-C (Proksch 
Deposition, p. n. Although the estate parcel could be accessed via ACR, this is not the only means of 
access. a portion of the estate parcel is bordered by Highway 93. Ex. 4, S-C (Proksch Deposition, p. II, n. 
19-22, p. n.3-4). Moreover, the Ditch Creek parcel is accessed by heading up Hughes Creek and then up Ditch 
Creek. Thus, the value of this property will also not be affected by the validation of ACR. Ex. 4, S-C (Proksch 
Deposition, p. 11. Mr. Proksch did not suggest any\vhere in his deposition that either of the properties will 
be benefited by making ACR a public road. Mr. Sopatyk's only "evidence" is the testimony of Joe Corlett who has 
never even visited the sites. Ex. 2 (Tr. Public Hearing, June 25, 2007 at 3-4). His conjecture that validation would 
increase the value of the property failed to take into account the alternative access available to the property. 
Moreover, the Commissioners reviewed the evidence presented by Mr. Sopatyk and expressly stated, in their 
November 2007 Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that "no evidence was presented to 
show that Commissioner Proksch, who voted originally to endorse the validation of Anderson Creek Road, had any 
contlict.. ." Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at 1. We have discovered at the last moment 
that this document is not in the record on this appeal. Counsel will file a motion to augment. 
48 Mr. Sopatyk's allegation of violation ofIdaho Code § 31-807 A also fails for a significant technical 
reason-the statute does not even apply to road validations. Rather, it applies only to purchase and sale transactions 
and contracts on behalf of a county: "No member of the board must be interested, directly or indirectly, in property 
purchased for the use of the county, nor in any purchase or sale of property belonging to the county, nor in lillY 
contract made by the board or other person on behalf of the county, for the erection of public buildings, the opening 
or improvement of roads, or the building of bridges, or for other purposes unless otherwise authorized by law." 
Idaho Code § 31-807 A (emphasis added). Mr. Sopatyk emphasized the "opening or improvement of roads" 
language but failed to realize that it is only relevant in the context of a contract. This is a road validation, not a 
"contract made by the board ... for ... the opening or improvement of roads." Thus, this statute does not apply to 
the present situation. 
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of Commissioners of Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 718, P.3d 863 (2002).49 Finally, 
Mr. Proksch was replaced by a new commissioner after the 2006 election. Thereafter, the 
Connty Commission voted again unanimously to validate the road, thus rendering moot any 
allegation with respect to the former commissioner. 50 
THE £'n,TTL1''''''' IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES; MR. SOP A TYK IS NOT. 
The Court's recent decisions interpreting the 2010 amendment to 
Idaho Code § put doubt the County's claims under that 
statute. 
in Smith v. Washington 2010 (Idaho 2010), 
afTransportation,2010 4297807 (Idaho 0), appear to be at 
to recover aWOITtev under Idaho § 1 17. 
statute which, was a response to the 
't Idaho 2 
49 Even if there were a showing of bias, remand may not be required where the biased commissioner did not 
cast a deciding vote. Floyd v. Board o/Commissioners o/Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 718,725-26, 52 P.3d 863, 
870-71 (2002). If the decision would have been the same without the biased vote, there are three factors to consider: 
whether the other members were aware of the bias, or the interest was disclosed; (2) the degree of the biased 
individual's participation; and (3) the extent of the biased interest. Floyd, 137 Idaho at 726,52 P.3d at 871 (relying 
on Griswald v. City a/Homer, 925 P.2d 1015 (Alaska 1996»). In Floyd, the Court concluded that "due process 
would be satisfied ... by simply disregarding Commissioner Christensen's vote rather than nullifying the decision 
and remanding the case for rehearing or reconsideration by an entirely new body of Commissioners." Floyd, 137 
Idaho at 726,52 P.3d at 871. The Idaho Supreme Court allowed the decision of the Commissioners in Floyd to 
stand, in the face of proven bias, and favored this result over the option of nullifying and remanding the decision. 
Applying the three part test above, it is conceded that Mr. Proksch played a significant role in the hearing as 
Chairman and Hearing Officer. However, the other two prongs strongly tilt in favor of no remand. First, there is no 
showing that the other commissioners were aware of the parcels in question or influenced by this fact. Second, the 
extent of the alleged bias is small. Indeed, the case for Mr. Proksch's bias is not nearly as strong as the bias 
evidence in Floyd, which was still not deemed enough to overturn the Commission's decision. Accordingly, if the 
Court determines there was bias, the appropriate result is to ignore his vote resulting in 2-0 unanimous decision. 
50 Most importantly, the entire matter is now moot. Mr. Proksch is a former Commissioner and no longer a 
participant in the validation proceeding. On August 13,2007, following his departure, the new County 
Commissioners voted again-unanimously-to validate the road. Thns, any remedy of remanding the matter to the 
Commission for a new vote has already been achieved. In the August 13, 2007 public hearing, each of the three 
current Commissioners (Robert Cope, Richard Snyder and Brett S. Barsalou) attested individually to having 
reviewed the entire record, having no improper interest in the validation of ACR and willing to vote again on a 
motion to validate ACR as either public or not public. Each Commissioner subsequently voted "yes" to validate 
ACR as a public road on a renewed motion for determination. This decision was made unanimously, without any 
improper bias, and should be upheld. Ex. 2 (Tr. Public Hearing, August 13, 2007). 
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(2009). Prior to Rammel!, the Coort interpreted Idaho Code § 1 17 as allowing the award 
attorney administrative proceedings and in appeal of administrative proceedings. 
Rammel! overturned that line cases, making attorney fee awards available in appeals from 
cases themselves. The Legislature responded 
matters as well. 
mc:onlDt~tel1t legislative drafting, the resulting 
authority to award attorney fees appeals 
unintended. Review of the legislative 
and Administrative 
Committee, 1 2010), as as 
admittedly 
interpretation is not unreasonable. 
rec~onslO,er its construction 2010 amendment 
and substitute a more nte:rpI'etcLtloln that would better achieve the apparent purpose of the 
attorney 
§ 1 17 is available to the County/I the District 
reversed, and attorney fees should be awarded on this 
appeal as ) states prevailing party is entitled to recover its attorney 
fees if the opposing party """'T<>" without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Idaho Code § 12-
117(1). The District Court found that Mr. Sopatyk did not act without a reasonable basis because 
51 The attorney fee statute could be available either by applying a more liberal reading to the 2010 
amendment or by determining not to apply the 2010 amendment retroactively. The 2010 statute states that it is to be 
applied retroactively, but that was plainly done in order to expand the availability of attorney fees to cases then 
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"[a]ttempts to recreate what occurred over one hundred years ago lend itself to reasonable 
disputes." R., pp. 37-38 (Memorandum Decision at 14-15).52 The County agrees it has been 
difficult to recreate such extensive history, but maintains the history compiled by the County's 
historian is sufficiently that Mr. Sopatyk's disputes are unreasonable. purpose of this 
statute to serve rI",t.,.....",..,t to groundless or litigation and to "Tn",,,, remedy 
financial burdens defending ",,,,.4LU •• H 
gr()U1JlmC~SS charges." 1<0,'1""'''''' v. Magic , 1 11 11 90 
these intentions exactly, as it is forced to continue spending 
scarce Tnv"",,,,,, .. TTlllnl-"V at a budgetary Sopatyk's 
set out 
matter. at the Court and, again, 
Sopatyk's were to be without any foundation. He now pursues this appeal 
with a is little more a word-for-word recital of the failed arguments he made to the 
detailed explanation offered the County in the briefing 
below. a number of misleading and inaccurate references to the record. 
at 1 IO(>tmcne 5 at 1 footnote 6 at 1 footnote 11 at 1 footnote 17 at 
at page at 34, footnote at 36, and footnote 46 at .) Fees are 
available under Idaho § 1 17 both before district court and this Court. Lane Ranch 
pending. There is a good argument that any restrictive aspect of the statute should not (and constitutionally cannot) 
be applied retroactively. 
52 This Court "exercises free review over the decision of the district court in applying Idaho Code 
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v. of Sun 145 Idaho 91, 1 780 (2007). For these 
County meets the standard set forth in Idaho Code 17(1), and is entitled to its 
attorney incurred to date. 
D, The County is entitled to its fees under I.A.R, 11.2. 
County is "'"Tn I """' to 11 bec:am;e Mr. Sopatyk and/or his 
,,~ 
appeaL J~ Recently, Lattin v. Adams 
to 11.2 and explained that "[a ]lthough 
not always appear clear from the record, this Court 
can infer the surrounding circumstances." 
(citing v. Liddle 
(quoting Neihart 
1 1 (2005»). In this 
held Appellate Rule 11.2 if it is "not well 
grounded in or a good-faith extension, modification, or 
reversal of "'A.l"LJlU~ interposed for an improper purpose." Lattin v. Adams 
v. Harvey, 147, Idaho 364, 
,209 P.3d 661,668 
record, litigation history clearly show that Mr. Sopatyk 
COlrltu1Ue:s to appeaL (See discussion above with 
.. ""<' .... "'''7 to Idaho Code § 1 1 It is apparent that Mr. Sopatyk has forced this litigation to 
53 In contrast to Mr. Sopatyk:, the County made its attorney fee claim in its first appellate brief to the 
District Court. At the time, it only identified Idaho Code § 12-117, which was then a proper basis for an award. 
Given the unforeseen change in law, the County should now be allowed to identify the additional basis ofI.A.R. 
12.2. If the Court determines that such a request should be made by motion, the County asks that this portion of the 
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continue over many years in the hope of wearing down the County and forcing it to abandon its 
position not because it is wrong but for budgetary reasons. He came very close to succeeding. If 
he is not required to pay for his costly and dilatory appeals, others will be encouraged to play the 
same of chicken with county officials. 
now. 
he cited the 
comes 
Sopatyk is not entitled to attorney fees as he failed to make an 
appropriate and timely request. 
on .... u"t .... ~."". review to the District but 
Sopatyk is not entitled to the attorney fees. 
~~~''-'H'U.. he failed to state the basis for the claim. 55 Third, 
12-121 and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l). Idaho Code § 12-121 allows a grant of 
attc)rne,y fees to the in any action, and is limited to actions initiated by a complaint. It does not 
apply in cases such as this administrative appeal initiated by petition. Johnson v. Blaine County, 146 Idaho 916, 204 
P.3d 1127 (2009). Similarly, I.R.c.P. 54(e)(l) allows an award of attorney fees in "any civil action, and only 
applies to actions initiated by a complaint. v. Bd. OjCounty Comm 'rsjor Ada County, 1 17 Idaho 1079, 
1081-82,793 P.2d 1251,1253-54 (1990). 
55 Idaho Appellate Rule 41(a) requires that the attorney fees request be made "in the fIrst appellate brief .. " 
as provided by Rules 35(a)(5) and 35(b)(5)." These rules require the party to "state the basis for the claim." Mr. 
Sopatyk's request fails because it does not state any basis. Indeed, the request is devoid of any argument as it 
consists of a partial unexplained quotation. This is insufficient. "[A] request for attorney fees should alert 
the other party to the basis upon which attorney fees are requested in order that the other party may have a sufficient 
opportunity to object." Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., 149 Idaho 437,235 P.3d 387, 398 (2010) (citing 
Bingham v. Montane Res. Assocs., 133 Idaho 420, 424, 987 P.2d 1035, 1039 (1999». For Me Sopatyk to be entitled 
to recover his fees on appeal, "authority and argument establishing a right to fees must be presented in the fIrst 
brief," as "citation to statutes and rules authorizing fees, without more, is insuffIcient." Borley v. Smith, 149 Idaho 
171,233 P.3d 102, 118 (2010). See also Goldman v. Graham, 139 Idaho 945,88 P.3d 764 (2004). Me Sopatyk's 
request lacks argument, is grossly insuffIcient, and should be excluded from this Court's review. 
56 Mr. Sopatyk's request for attorney fees fails is because he did not make the request in his "ftrst appellate 
brief," which was to the District Court. Accordingly, his request on this second appeal is too late. The judicial 
review to the District Court was subject to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(r), which made the Idaho Appellate 
Rules applicable to apply to any procedure not specifted in Rule 84. Because I.R.C.P. 84 does not prescribe a 
method for requesting attorney fees, LA.R. 41(a) was applicable. 
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CONCLUSION 
each of the reasons discussed the County's decision recognizing ACR as a 
public road should be affirmed and the County should be awarded its attorney fees incurred 
defending these frivolous appeals. 
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History: 
laws. at p. 578, § 1 (1864), 
laws. at p, 677. § 1 (1875), 
reak In history 
Territory laws. at p, 277. § 1 
Territory laws. at p, 162, § 1 
- break in history -
Rev, Stat. of Idaho Terr, §§ 850.851 
(1887), 
Idaho Sess. laws at p. 12 
I,C, Ann, §§ 1137.113 
1 Idaho Code Ann. §§ 
Idaho Ses$, Laws ch. 55 
1 Compiled Laws §§ 874. 875 
1 Compiled Stat. §§ 1302, 130 
391.C, Ann. §§ 39-101.39-103 
Idaho Code §§ 40·101, 4Q.l03 
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The law since 1893 has provided two 
methods of road creation: 
Method 1 (formal action;: 
"Roads laid out and recorded as 
highways by order of a board of 
.ommlssloners and all roads used as 
slich for a period of five years. providE 
the latter shall have been worked and 
kept up at the expense of the public or 
located and recorded by order ofthe 
board of commissioners are highways. 
Method 2 (public use & maintenance;: 
"Roads laid oot and recorded as 
highways. by order of a board of 
commissioners. and all roads used as 
such for a period of fiye years prgvided 
the latter shall have been worked and 
kept up at the expense of the public or 
located and recorded by order ofthe 
board of commissioners, are highways, ~ 
In the current codification. these 
in the def.nition 
and in the 
40-202(3». 
In 1993 (H.B. 388) the Legislature 
adopted a new section 204A which 
declared that "construction and forst use" 






based on the absence of use and 
mamtenance rather than affirmative 
official action declaring an abandonment. 
Some courts and commentators reler to 
this as 'infoomal abandonment. 
The passive abandonment statute has 
been restricted and narrowed 
and was finally repealed in 
In 1963 the slatute was amended (H B 
15) to make it applicable only to roads 
created by preSCription. that is. roads 
created under Melhod 2 efthe Road 
Creation Statute. Arguably. this merely 
codified prior see discussion under 
H.B.1S. 
In the same S.B. 267 established 
mandatory procedures for 
abandonment of roads prOviding aCCess 
to public lands 
V. Board of Comm'r s of 
County ("Floyd iI? 137 Idaho 
718.52 P.3d 863 (2002). recardino the 
In 1993 (S.B. 1108) the 
repealed the passive abandonment 
provision altogether 
388 added new 
ith R.S. 2477 
Among other things. it 
Formal AbandonmentIVacatlon & 
Validation (County and Combined) 
In oulline. 
to mechanisms for abamdoOlneJnt 
affirmative. declaration 
Idaho's first loomel ab'lOdononein! 
was enacted 
Nicolaus v. 
section 40-501 to require formal findings 
that the road is no longer necessary 
section 
Formal Abando!1mentIVacation & 
Validation (Highway Districts) 
In 1986. the Legislature enacted new 




















Formal AbandcmmentNacatlon Formal AbandonmentNacation Passive Abandonment Validation (County and Combined) Validation (Highway DIstrlcts) 
states that abandonment ~~~c!pl"~ 















Today Road Creation 
CITE: § 
CITE: Idaho Code 40-106(3). 
~UOTE 
"40-106. Definitions - E. 
-(3) 'Expense of the public' means the 
expenditure of funds for roadway 
maintenance by any governmental 
agency, including funds expended by any 
agency of the federal government, so long 
as the agency allows public access over 
the roadway on which the funds were 
expended and such roadway is no! 




Formal AbandonmentlVacatioll 8< 
Validation (County and Combined) 
Formal AbandonmentlVacation 
Validation (Highway Districts) 
§~ 















Today Road Creation 
CITE: Idaho Code 40-109(5), 
QUOTE: 
"40-109, Definitions - H 
CITE: Idaho Code § 40-204A, 
Statutes As 
Passive Abandonment Formal AbandonmentlVacatlon 8. Validation (County and Combined) 
abandoomenl or vacation 
whether or not 10 abandon 
)lic right of 
Formal AbandonmentNacation 

















jllstification for considering these rights-of-
io have been abandoned, 
l) All ofthe said rights-of-way shall 
be shown some form of documentation 
to have prior to the withdrawal of 
the federal grant In 1976 or to predate the 
removal of land through wi 
from the public domain for 
purposes, Documentation 
form of a map, an affidavit surveys, books 
or other historic information, 
-( 4) These rights-ol-way shall not 
require maintenance for the 01 





user and may be maintained by the public 
I usage by the public, 
Any member of the public, Ihe 
of Idaho and any of Its political 
subdivisions, and any agency of the 
federal government may choose 10 seek 
validation of Its rights under law to use 
granted rights-ol-way either tI 
process set forth by the state 
through processes set forth by any 
federal agency or by proclamation of user 
rights granted under the prOVisions of the 
original act, Revised Statute 2477, 
"Persons seeking to have a federal land 
)f-way, InCluding those which fumlsh 
access to siate an d federal 
and waters, validated as a 
ilic light-ol-way as part of a 
or highway official highway system, 
follow the procedure outlined In section 
Statutes As They Read 
Passive Abandonment Formal AbandonmentNacation Validation (County and Comblne<l) 
easements may 
ued use of 
existing sewer, gas, water. or similar 
pipelines and appurtenances, or other 
Formal AbandonmentNacation & 

















Today Road Creation 
shall record 
acl<nc>WI"dgerrienlls. including supporting 
rl"r"'n''''t~t'''" and maintain an 
appropliate index of same 
Statutes As 
Passive Abandonment Formal AbandonmenWacatlon & Validation (County and Combined) 
Uf1derarooncl facilities as defined in 
ldeho Code. for dttches 
appurtenances. and for electric. 
and simlar lines and 
Formal AbandonmenWacation & 
Validation (Highway Distrlctsj 
8~ ~~ 
': ~ ~2 
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Statutes As 














Road Creatiol1 Passive Abandonment Formal AbandonmentNacation & Validation (County and Combinedl 
and 
Formal AbandonmentlVacation &. 
Validation (Highway DistriCts) 
§::tI 
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Today Road Creation 
Statutes As 
Passive Abandonment Formal AbandonmentNacatlon & Validation (County and Combined) 
Formal AbandonmentNacation 















1864 Road Creation 
at 
QUOTE: 
NOTE This Idaho's 
first road statute, cons/sled of a blanket 
declaration of all roads then In public use, 
with 
act 
Historical Statutes and Amendments 
Passive Abandonment Formal AbandonmentiVacatlon 11 Validation (County and Combined) 
Formal AbandonmentiVacation & 
Validation (Highway Districts) 
g~ 
c;Joo g;'"e 


















hat in case, 
now closed, 
NOTE This was the second blanket 
declaration, This statute, however. 
excluded avoided turning toll 
roads, 
Historical Statutes and Amendments 
Abandonment Formal AbandonmentiVacation Validation (County and Combined) 
Formal AbandonmentiVacation 
Validation {Highway Dlstrlctsl 
§~ 
g;r.I'J 











1881 Road Creation 
CITE: Gen. Laws of 
p 277. § 1 (1881) 
QUOTE: 
of Idaho, at 
"Section 1 All public highways roops 
streets, and thoroughfares, which are Of 
have been used as sych at any time 
within two Yl!!![li pnor to the passage of 
an act entitled ~An Act concerning roads 
trails and public thoroughfares" 
approved January 12th 1875. or which 
may hereafter be declared such by the 
boord of County Commissioners within 
!heir resooctjve counties shell b~ 
considered county roads. All roads or 
highways laid out or now traveled or 
which have been commonly used by the 
public including such as have been 
wrongfully closed at any time since 
January 12 1873 in the several counties 
of this T erritory are hereby declarecj 
county roads; excepting however roads 
and highways upon which franchises 
have heretofore been granted, so long as 
the franchise of aoy s\lch road sb§1I 
remain in ful! force and effect." 
NOTE: This 1881 law restated the 
blanket declaration of 1875 and then 
included another blanket declaration. 
again excluding toll roads 
Historical Statutes and Amendments 
Passive Abandonment Formal AbandonmentiVacation & Validation (County and Combined) 
Formal AbandonmentiVacation & 













1885 Road Creation 
CITE: Gen. Laws of 
p 162. § 1 (1885) 
QUQTE: 
o/Idaho, 
Historical Statutes and Amendments 
Abandonment 
the end ofthe 
declares that roads 
aller loor years no looger 
(See statute left) 
Formal AbandonmentlVacation 
Validation (County and Combined) 
Formal AbandonmentlVacation 












1887 Road Creation 
Rev. Slat. 
QUOTE: 
NOTE: This 1887 codification replaced 
the earlier territorial road creation statutes 
and created the basic statutOI)' format 
which remains in in sections 
4()..109(5) and that as of 
1887, there was no for 
maintenance. 
The Court explained the 
Interaction of the two sections: 'It is clear 
that § 850 defines what may 
constitute a highway in the State of Idaho, 
and that § 851 governs the procedure for 
the creation of a highway in the State of 
Idaho,' Galli v, Idaho County, 146 Idaho 
155, 160, 191 P,3d 233, 238 (2008), 
Historical Statutes and Amendments 
Passive Abandonment 
CITE: Rev, Stat. of Idaho TerL 
QUOTE: 
codified at Idaho C 
repealed by S,B 1 
NOTE: This was Idaho's first road 
abandonment statute, It was substantially 
amended limited) in 1963, In 1985, 
all of Title was repealed and this 
section was 
Formal AbandonmentlVacation & 
Validation (County and Combined) 
NO TE: This statute was recodified several 
times. but was unchanged unti11985, when 
it was repealed 
sions in se 
Idaho Code § 
traced back 
Idaho, al p, 162, 
but that eartier version of II 
not authorize abandonment. 
Formal AbandonmentlVacatiQn & 
Validation (Highway DIstricts) 
§~ 











Historical Statutes and Amendments 
Road Creation Passive Abandonment 
CITE: Idaho Admission Bill, 26 Stat Sess, 
NOTE: July 1890, Idaho was admittad to the Idaho's Constitution 
AbandonmenWaeirtion 8< 
Validation (County and Combined) 
in 
Formal AbandonmenWacation 
















1893 Road Creation 
CITE. 1893 Idaho Sess. Laws all 2. 
(then codified at Rev. Stat. 
851: codified amended 
§§ and 4()"202(3)) 
NOTE: The 1893 Amendment contained 
only a single change to the 1887 
Codification. It left section 850 
unchanged. The only substant 
was to add the maintenance reouirement 
to section 851. 
NOTE. numerous minor 
amendments, the 
provisions of sections 850 and 851, as 
amended in 1893. remain nearly identical 
today. They are now codified 
(redundantly) in sections 40-109(5) and 
40-202(3). 
Historical Statutes and Amendments 
Passive Abandonment Formal AbandonmenWacation & Validation (County and Combined) 
,;;':n~~~;;:'~"" or abandon such as 
Formal AbandonmenWacation & 
Validation (Highway Districts) 
o~ 
8t!l ~'Jl 






1901 Road Creation 
NOTE: No change in 
Historical Statutes and Amendments 
Passive Abandonment 
No change In 
Formal AbandonmentNacatlon & 
Validation [County and Combined) 
Formal AbandonmentNacatlon & 
Validation {Highway Districts} 
§~ 
















1908 Road Creation 
CITE 1 Idaho Code Ann §§ 
QUOTE: 
as amended at 
and 40-202(3» 
by order board of 
co!TlITlls!~Orlers, and all roads 
used as such a period of five years, 
provided the later shall have been worked 
and kept up at the 01 the 
or located and by order 
board of commissioners. are hig!" 
Whenever any corporation owning a 
bridge, or a tump'lke, plank, or cornmon 
wagon road is dissolved or discontinues 
the road or has expired by 
limitation, the or 
highway' 
NOTE: No change in langu8ge. 
Historical Statutes and Amendments 
Passive Abandonment 
QUOTE 
'''~-I4;}''JiJll~. Abandonment of 
A worked or used for 
of five years ceases to be a 
highway for purpose whatever 
NOTE: No change in language 
Formal AbandonmentiVacation &. 
Validation (County and Combined) 
Formal AbandoomentiVacation 
Validation (Highway Districts) 
§~ 
~1JJ 











1911 Road Creation 
191" Idaho Sess, Laws ch, 55, 
District Act of 1(11) (not 
NOTE: This 1911 statute 
creation of highway d 
time, Its Introductory 
contained a deficit I 
above) based on a 
of the in section 1137 The 
1138 did not 
in In subsequent 
code reverted to the language 
1137 and 1138, 
Historical Statutes and Amendments 
Passive Abandonment Formal AbandonmentNacatlon & Validation (County and Combined) 
Formal AbanclonmentNacation 
Validation (Highway DiStricts) 
§~ 
~CIl 
': ~ ~:l 






1919 Road Creation 
NOTE: No change in language 
Historical Statutes and Amendments 
Passive Abandonment 
worked or used for the 
offive years ceases to 
any purpose 
NOTE: 
Formal AbandonmentlVacation & 
Validation (ColJnty and Combined) 
Formal AbandonmentIVacCltion & 














1921 Road Creation 
Historical Statutes and Amendments 
Passive Abandonment Formal AbandonmentJVacation & Validation (County and Combined) 
CITE: IdahoSess< 
codified at C, 
later codified 
codified as amended 
§ 40-604) 
The board of County 
Commissi"ners< by proper actinances< 
-3< Cause to be recaded as 
such roads as have become 
or abandonment to the public< 
-4< Abolish a abandon such as are 
NOTE: Subsection olthe session 
(' This Inconsistent 
subsequent stalemen!s of 
an errOL 
Formal AbandonmentJVacation & 
Validation (Highway Districts) 
-~ §t'!l g::", 
,00 "<:I 
~o ~\ Z 











1927 Road Creation 
Historical Statutes and Amendments 
Passive Abandonment Formal AbandonmentNacation 11 Validation (County and Combined) 
Formal AbandonmentNacation 11 














1932 Road Creation 
and 
QUOTE: 
are streets or 
laid out or erected by 
the public, or out or erected 
others, dedicated or abandoned 
'Jj-'~~~~Ui!:.ll~=-, Recorded 
laid out 
by order of the 
board and all roads 
used as such for a period of five years, 
provided the later shall have been worked 
and kept up at the expense of the public 
or located and recorded by order of the 
board of commissioners, are hlghwa 
Whenever any corporation owning a 
bridge, or a turnpike, plank, or common 
wagon road is dissolved, or discontinues 
the road or bridge, or has expired by 
limitation, the bridoe or 
highway,' 
NOTE No change In language, 
Historical Statutes and Amendments 
Passive Abandonment 
_ worked or 
period of five years ceases to 
be a highway for any purpose whatever' 
NOTE: No change in language, 
Formal AbandonmentNacation &. 




NOTE: in language, 
Formal AbandonmentNacation &. 
Validation (Highway DistriCts) 
CITE 39 Idaho Code Ann, § 39·1524 
amended at 
No in language 
§~ 
~oo 











1943 Road Creation 
Historical Statutes and Amendments 
Passive Abandonment Formal AbandonmenWacation & Validation (County and Combined) 
CITE: SS, 1943ldahoSess, 
i (then codified at Idaho Code 
later codified at Idaho Code 
as 
Formal AbandonmenWacation 





















1948 Road Creation 
as amended at 
and 4()'202(3)1 
QUOTE: 
NOTE: The Idaho Code was created in 
1948. Former Title 39 was reclassified to 
Title 40. No change in language. 
Historical Statutes and Amendments 
Passive Abandonment 
CITE: Code § 
QUOTE 
Abandonment 
road not worked or used 
period of frve years ceases to 
highway for any purpose whatever, 
NOTE: No change In language 
Formal AbandonmentlVacation & 
Validation (County and Combined) 
Formal AbandonmentlVacation 11 
Validation (Highway Districts) 
§~ 
~oo 








1950 Road Creation 
QUOTE: 
"Section 2. H,GHWAYS DEFINED. -
Highways are hereby defined U foads. 
streets. _lIey,;, and bridges. laid out or 
_~stablished for the public, or4 
leiS ,,~I <If @restes 8y ether.;. dedicated or 
abandoned to the public. Such highwa'{1i 
shall include necessary culverts sluices 
drains dit.hes waterways 
embankments retaining walls. bridge§ 
tunnels grade ssparation stryctyres 
foadside improvements pedestrian 
facjlrties and any other structures Of 
fixtures jncidental to the Qresjlrvation or 
improvement of such highw8)l!!,: 
NOTE: S.R 62 established the slate 
department Section 24 olthe 
.Ied the definition section (section 
and replaced it with the 
~d section 2 quoted above. The 
1950 Act contained no on road 
creation or passive ab"nejoomEmi. 
Historical Statutes and Amendments 




























1951 Road Creation 
Historical Statutes and Amendments 
Passive Abandonment Formal AbandonmentNacation 8. Validation (County and Combined) 
NOTE: The 1951 Act restated the 
of county commissioners to abandon 
roads as provided in the 1950 AcL 
public Interest 
NOTE: The 
• requirement for 
action 
redundant) statement of 
40-S()1 remained on the 
when bath provisions were replaced 
section 
Formal AbandonmentNacation 8. 
Validation (Highway Districts) 
§~ 
~~ 










1961 Road Creation 
and 
"Section 40·107. Highways defined. -
Highways are hereby defined as roads. 
streets. alleys and bridges. laid out or 
established for the public or dedicated Or 
abandoned to the public. Such 
shall include necessary cUlverls. 
drains. ditches. waterways. 
embankments. retaining walls. bodges. 
tunnels. grade separation structures. 
roadside improvements. pedestrian 
facilities. and any other structures. works 
or fixtures Incidental to the preservation 
improvement of such highways.' 
NOTE: This is the re-codification 
implements the 1950 and 1951 Acts by 
section 40·101 with 40·107 
was unchanged. 
Historical Statutes and Amendments 
Passive Abandonment Formal AbandonmentNacation 8. Validation (County and Combined) 
Formal AbandonmentNacation & 
Validation (Highway Districts) 
§~ 
~'" 










1963 Road Creation 
Historical Statutes and Amendments 
Passive Abandonment 
HR 15" 19631dahoSess 
{then codified at Idaho Code 
or codified at 
QUOTE: 
"40-104" ABANDoNMENT OF HIGHWAYS-
A 
Formal AbandonmenWacation & 
Validation (County and Combined) 
Formal AbandonmenWacatlon & 
Validation (Highway Districts) 
NOTE: S.R 243" the companion bill 
S.R 242" to roads by 
'Y It also esl:ablist,ed 
orocedures for abandonment 



















1963 Road Creation 
Historical Statutes and Amendments 
Abandonment 
NOTE: limitation to 
in H.B. 15. More 
signifl,carrtlv. it added formal procedures 
for when access 
lands Is involved. Note that S. B. did 
same thing for highway districts 
NOTE. This item is listed under the 
lassive" abandonment column, because 
amends the passive abandonment 
slatute. However. S.B. 242 added formal 
abandonment requirements to the passive 
abandonment 
Format AbandonmentNacatlon & 
Validation (County and Combinedl 
Formal AbandonmentNacatlon & 

























installation of signs or 
tend to restrict or prohibit public use 
NOTE: Recodified section 
section Changes in language 
were 
Formal AbandonmentNacation 8. 
Validation (County and Combined) 
Formal AbandonmentNaciltion 8. 
Valldatlon !Hlghway Districts) 
court 
~!l1!t.hlg/lway 
same manner in appeals are taken 
§~ 
~r.J'l 











1985 Road Creation 
NOTE: H,B, 265 repealed aU of Title 40, 
it with a new title. Note that the 
reiterates the provisions of 
section 40-202, 
Historical Statutes and Amendments 
Passive Abandonment Formal AbandonmentlVacation & Validation (County and Combined) 
Formal AbandonmentIVacatlon & 




<: ~ ~2: 







1986 Road Creation 
laid out and 
recorqe(]._~_""" by order of a 
c""nm,.",mAICS and ail ~ 
of five 
or 
NOTE: H,B, 556 expanded former 
section 4()-202, The old "creation' section 
became subsection New 
at the end 40-202(3) 
lere is 
not on the map. H.B. 
not amend the definition section 
(section 4()-109(5)). 
Historical Statutes and Amendments 
Passive Abandonment 
waters, no person may encroach 
Ihem and reslnet 
use 
NOTE: 
Formal AbandonmentNacation & 
Validation (County and Combined) 
Formal AbandonmentNacation 8. 

















HISS Road Creation 
Historical Statutes and Amendments 
Passive Abandonment Formal AbandonmentNacatlon .& Validation (County and Combined) 
OUOTE. 
Formal AbandonmentNacation 
Validation (Highway DistriCts) 
§~ 
~rJ) 












1986 Road Creation 
Historical Statutes and Amendments 
Passille Abandonment Formal AbandonmenWacation & Validation (County and Combinedl 
Formal AbandonmenWacatlon & 
Validation (Highway Districts) 
-:= S['!l 
~,." 















HISS Road Creation 
CITE: 
"40-202. DESIGNATlONOF 
laid out and recorded. 
all 
Historical Statutes and Amendments 
Abandonment Formal AbandonmentIVacation & Validation (County and Combined) 
Formal AbandonmentlVacation & 
Validation (Highway DIStlicts) 
§~ 












NOTE: The 1988 Amendments deleted 
obsolete provisions dealing wllh former 
roads, 
Historical Statutes and Amendments 
Passive Abandonment Formal AbandonmentiVacation & Validation (County and Combined) 
§~ 
i5:fJO 













1992 Road Creation 
H.B. 627. 1992 Idaho Sess. laws 
1 (codified as amended at Idaho 
QUOTE' 
'40-202. DESIGNA110N OF HIGHWAYS. 
opened 




Formal AbandonmentiVacation 8. 
Validation (County and Combined) 
Formal AbandonmentiVacation 8. 
Validation (Highway Districts) 
















Historical Statutes and Amendments 






Of resolution to be recorded the 
county records and the official map o!the 
to be amended as 
ab"ncloolmeni and Vllcatioo. 
AlL .,CY:tt1\th\ 
Formal AbandonmentiVacatlon & 














1993 Road Creation 
CITE: S.B. 1108. 1993ldahoSess. 
eM (codified at Idaho Code 
QUOTE: 
"40-202. DeSIGNATION OF HIGHWAYS.illiQ 
1108 added a definition 
Historical Statutes and Amendments 
PassivE! Abandonment 
NOTE: The above amendment had 
effect of repealing the passive road 
abandonment procedure 
Formal AbandonmentNacation & 
Validation (County and Combinedl 
Formal AbandQnmentNacatloo & 

















Historical Statutes and Amendments 
Road Creation Passive Abandonment 
QUOTE: 
CITE: H"B. 388, 1993 Idaho 
§§ 40-107(5)" 40-204A) 
(codified as amended alldaho 
NOTE" The full text of section 204A as amended" is 
"Statutes as they read today,," 
NOTE: H.8" 388 added a new definition for "federal land 
40-107(5) which defines them in terms oflhe federal stal 
added a new section 204A dealing with R.s 2477 riQihts-of.-WEIY 
the heading 
important proviSions" section 40-204A(1) and first use" are 
suffiCient to accept R.S" 2477 rights-of-way 40-204A(2) states Ihat 
abandonment principles do not apply to R"$,, 2477 lights-of-way" 
Formal AbandonmentiVacatlon & 
Validation (County and Combined) 
the commissioners 
determine that 
Formal AbandonmentiVacation & 
Validation (Highway Districts) 
§~ 
~~ 










1993 Road Creation 
Historical Statutes and Amendments 
Passive Abandonment Formal AbandonmentlVacatlon & Validation (County and Combined) 
abandonment and vacation. 
QUOTE 
1108, 1993 Idaho SeS$, 
6 (codified Idaho 
Formal AbandonmentlVacation & 
Validation (Highway Districts) 
§~ 









1993 Road Creation 
Historical Statutes and Amendments 
Passive Abandonment Formal AbandonmentlVacation & Validation (Highway Distrlctsj 
§~ 
~"" I: ~ 













Historical Statutes and Amendments 
NOTE: 1108 also added a new 
CITE: 8.B. 1108, 1993 Idaho Sess. 
ch.412. 7 (codifled at Idaho Code 
OUOTE 
-40-604. DUTfESANO POWERS OF 
COMMISSIONERS. Commissioners shall: 
Formal AbandonmentiVacatlon 8. 
















1993 Road Creation 
Historical Statutes and Amendments 
Passive Abandonment Formal AbandonmentIVacatlon & Validation (County and Combined) 
section 4IHl04( 4) must be exercised 
to the procedures spelled out 
Formal AbandonmentlVacatlon & 
Validation (Highway DIstricts) 
o~ 
:::l['O:l 












1994 Road Creation 
Historical Statutes and Amendments 
Abandonment Formal AbandonmentiVacatlon Validation {County and Combined} 
§~ 
i;::00 
': ~ ~"" 2 
::;00 








1995 Road Creation 
CITE: S.8. 1117. 1995 Idaho Sass 
(codified at Idaho Code 
Added hyphens to "right-ai-way 
and 
Historical Statutes and Amendments 
Passive Abandonment Formal AbandonmentiVacation & Validation (County and Combined} 
Formal AbandonmentlVacation & 
Validation (Highway Districts) 
§~ 
~"" I: cg 










1995 Road Creation 
Historical Statutes and Amendments 
Passive Abandonment Formal AbandonmenttVacatlon Validation (County and Combined) 
Formal AbanoonmenttVacatlon 












2000 Road Creation 
NOTE: Eliminated references to highway 
map. 
Historical Statutes and Amendments 
Abandonment AbandonmellWacation 8. Vall/da,tlon (County and Combined) 
Formal AbandonmenWacation & 
Validation (Highway Districts) 
§~ 










2000 Road Creation 
Historical Statutes and Amendments 
PassivE! Abandonment Formal AbandonmentiVacation Validation (County and Combined) 
Formal AbandonmentiVacatlon & 
Validation (Highway Districts) 
RESPONSE BRIEF 
1007368 _39,5720.9 
Page 101 of 103 
-~ Srrl 
;':r.n 












CITE: lUI. 1108. 1993 Idaho Bess. 




CITE: 1998 Idaho Sess. 
Res. No. 136. 
CITE: S.B. 1408.2000 Idaho Bess. 
ch. 252 § 1 (codified at Idaho Code 
40-117) 
CITE: Idaho Code 
1985 Idaho Sess. 
Other Provisions on Road Creation and Abandonment 
maintenance 





either to remCMl 
court an action to abate the encroachment as a nuisance. 
encroachment abated. up hundred fifty dollars 
action and remOlfflI. 





': ~ ~:z 







Other Provisions Bearing on Road Creation and Abandonment 
Citation Comment 
recover costs and expenses. as remained nollee 
was complete." 

